wishIwasSalludon
broken but not destroyed
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Making this thread after a discussion I had with @swt and @onelife
Im a atheist, for some reason atheists are obsessed with denying the PSR even though its completely compatible with atheism
Ill be defending it here
The main problem with PSR deniers is that the ability to rationalize needs you to assume that the PSR is true
In otherwords to attack the PSR you need to assume the PSR is true.
what is the PSR
There are two versions of the PSR
The "strong" PSR - Every contingent thing has an explanation for why it is and what it isnt
The "weak" PSR - Every contingent thing has an explanation for why it is not necessarily what it isnt
Responding to common objections of the PSR:
Objection 1:
quantum mechanics debunks the PSR
Response to objection 1:
quantum mechanics is only incompatible with the strong PSR
The weak PSR only needs to explain the cause of a particular outcome happened not why it isnt something else
allow me to give an example
a non deterministic coin can land either head or tails
we flip the coin and it lands heads
the reason the coin landed heads is because we flipped the coin
if it were to land tails it would be because we flipped the coin
the strong PSR needs to explain why it was tails and not heads or heads and not tails, the weak PSR need not do such a thing
in the case of QM the reason is that the wave function collapsed it need not explain why it collapsed into one state or the other
the weak PSR is completely compatible with indeterminism
Objection 2:
If all things need an explanation then what is the explanation for the PSR.
In other words the PSR seems to assume the PSR
Response to objection 2:
the PSR as formulated by Alexander Pruss is only applicable to contingent things not all things
even if we said it was applicable to all things its possible that the PSR is a necessary fact and not a brute fact(there is a difference)
Defending the PSR
(a) An inductive argument: when we look for explanations in the real world, we tend to find them, and even when we don't, we usually suppose it's an instance of an unknown explanation rather than an instance of there being literally no explanation whatsoever. This is evidence in favor of PSR.
(b) An abductive argument: the fact that we tend to see explanations in the real world is more strongly predicted on the hypothesis that PSR is true than the hypothesis that PSR is false. Again, this is evidence in favor of PSR.
(c) An argument from empirical knowledge: it seems our empirical knowledge is in some sense contingent upon PSR. For instance, if I experience a perception of a chicken sandwich in front of me, this experience can only be veridical if there is a chicken sandwhich causing my perception (in one way or another). But if PSR is false, my perceptions could literally happen without cause, which would undermine our empirical knowledge, for we could never know the perception was actually corresponding to the truth of the matter (i.e. an actual chicken sandwich). But it seems obvious we do know some empirical knowledge, so PSR is true.
(d) An argument from our rationality: whenever we take a claim to be rationally justified, we suppose not only that we have a reason for accepting the claim (in the sense of a rational justification) but also that this reason is the reason why we accept the claim (in the sense of causing or explaining our acceptance). We suppose it is because we possess good reasons that we believe what we do. But if PSR is false, we have no reason for thinking this is the case. We might believe what we do for no reason whatsoever, and even the fact that it seems we believe what we do in virtue of good reasons could itself be a brute fact lacking any explanation. Yet this would apply to all our beliefs equally, and so if we assume PSR is false, it's not clear we could know we believe anything in virtue of good reasons. Yet again, it's obvious at least some of our beliefs are possessed in virtue of good reasons, so we should accept PSR.
(e) An argument from science: we suppose science provides us with genuine explanations of phenomena in the world. But if PSR is false, it's not clear this is the case. For instance if PSR is false, explanations in terms of physics would look something like: law of physics A is explained by law of physics B, which is explained by C, yet C is just a brute fact lacking any explanation. But this is perhaps not an explanation at all. Suppose I say the fact that a book hasn't fallen to the floor is explained in virtue of the fact that it is sitting on a shelf, and the fact that the shelf hasn't fallen to the floor is a brute fact lacking any explanation. If that's the case, it's difficult to see how I've explained the position of the book at all, for there's nothing about the shelf, per hypothesis, that could explain the position of the book, i.e. there's nothing about the shelf that explains why it hasn't fallen to the floor, so it's difficult to see how it could impart such a property to the book. And likewise for physical laws. So if PSR is false, no scientific explanations are actually genuine explanations. Yet this is absurd, so PSR is true.
(f) An argument from Occams razor: Occams razor seems implies that the PSR is true atleast in the vast majority of cases. Since occams razor states that the most simple explanation is usually the correct one, but to deny the PSR is to say that things can occur for no reason at all, meaning any explanation is more likely than something coming from nothing since something coming from nothing is not an explanation at all
@HarrierDuBois @moredatesmorerapes
Im a atheist, for some reason atheists are obsessed with denying the PSR even though its completely compatible with atheism
Ill be defending it here
The main problem with PSR deniers is that the ability to rationalize needs you to assume that the PSR is true
In otherwords to attack the PSR you need to assume the PSR is true.
what is the PSR
There are two versions of the PSR
The "strong" PSR - Every contingent thing has an explanation for why it is and what it isnt
The "weak" PSR - Every contingent thing has an explanation for why it is not necessarily what it isnt
Responding to common objections of the PSR:
Objection 1:
quantum mechanics debunks the PSR
Response to objection 1:
quantum mechanics is only incompatible with the strong PSR
The weak PSR only needs to explain the cause of a particular outcome happened not why it isnt something else
allow me to give an example
a non deterministic coin can land either head or tails
we flip the coin and it lands heads
the reason the coin landed heads is because we flipped the coin
if it were to land tails it would be because we flipped the coin
the strong PSR needs to explain why it was tails and not heads or heads and not tails, the weak PSR need not do such a thing
in the case of QM the reason is that the wave function collapsed it need not explain why it collapsed into one state or the other
the weak PSR is completely compatible with indeterminism
Objection 2:
If all things need an explanation then what is the explanation for the PSR.
In other words the PSR seems to assume the PSR
Response to objection 2:
the PSR as formulated by Alexander Pruss is only applicable to contingent things not all things
even if we said it was applicable to all things its possible that the PSR is a necessary fact and not a brute fact(there is a difference)
Defending the PSR
(a) An inductive argument: when we look for explanations in the real world, we tend to find them, and even when we don't, we usually suppose it's an instance of an unknown explanation rather than an instance of there being literally no explanation whatsoever. This is evidence in favor of PSR.
(b) An abductive argument: the fact that we tend to see explanations in the real world is more strongly predicted on the hypothesis that PSR is true than the hypothesis that PSR is false. Again, this is evidence in favor of PSR.
(c) An argument from empirical knowledge: it seems our empirical knowledge is in some sense contingent upon PSR. For instance, if I experience a perception of a chicken sandwich in front of me, this experience can only be veridical if there is a chicken sandwhich causing my perception (in one way or another). But if PSR is false, my perceptions could literally happen without cause, which would undermine our empirical knowledge, for we could never know the perception was actually corresponding to the truth of the matter (i.e. an actual chicken sandwich). But it seems obvious we do know some empirical knowledge, so PSR is true.
(d) An argument from our rationality: whenever we take a claim to be rationally justified, we suppose not only that we have a reason for accepting the claim (in the sense of a rational justification) but also that this reason is the reason why we accept the claim (in the sense of causing or explaining our acceptance). We suppose it is because we possess good reasons that we believe what we do. But if PSR is false, we have no reason for thinking this is the case. We might believe what we do for no reason whatsoever, and even the fact that it seems we believe what we do in virtue of good reasons could itself be a brute fact lacking any explanation. Yet this would apply to all our beliefs equally, and so if we assume PSR is false, it's not clear we could know we believe anything in virtue of good reasons. Yet again, it's obvious at least some of our beliefs are possessed in virtue of good reasons, so we should accept PSR.
(e) An argument from science: we suppose science provides us with genuine explanations of phenomena in the world. But if PSR is false, it's not clear this is the case. For instance if PSR is false, explanations in terms of physics would look something like: law of physics A is explained by law of physics B, which is explained by C, yet C is just a brute fact lacking any explanation. But this is perhaps not an explanation at all. Suppose I say the fact that a book hasn't fallen to the floor is explained in virtue of the fact that it is sitting on a shelf, and the fact that the shelf hasn't fallen to the floor is a brute fact lacking any explanation. If that's the case, it's difficult to see how I've explained the position of the book at all, for there's nothing about the shelf, per hypothesis, that could explain the position of the book, i.e. there's nothing about the shelf that explains why it hasn't fallen to the floor, so it's difficult to see how it could impart such a property to the book. And likewise for physical laws. So if PSR is false, no scientific explanations are actually genuine explanations. Yet this is absurd, so PSR is true.
(f) An argument from Occams razor: Occams razor seems implies that the PSR is true atleast in the vast majority of cases. Since occams razor states that the most simple explanation is usually the correct one, but to deny the PSR is to say that things can occur for no reason at all, meaning any explanation is more likely than something coming from nothing since something coming from nothing is not an explanation at all
@HarrierDuBois @moredatesmorerapes
imagine believing in this all came from nothing and not a universal entity that grounds everything. Gooooooddddddd Gaytheists are so fucking mentally braindead
