(BRUTAL) Ahmed88 cares more about internet points then defending his religion

[brielarsonbf]

argument

 

[n.rth2]

What's your response to cosmological fine tuning?

its predicted under analytic idealism

Also late cosmologist Douglas Adams put it best: "Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This hole I find myself in is perfectly shaped to fit me, must have been designed for me!'" In that sense u could say we in are the puddle. Of course the universe's constants allow us to exist if they didn't, we wouldn't be here to measure them. We are adapted to the universe, not the other way around.

Also 99.9% of the universe is lethal, if the universe was actually fine-tuned by an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God specifically to host life, it is for some reason hostile to life.

And if the constants are physically necessary then you can't even make an argument from probability.

 

[n.rth2]

View attachment 5368127

yea i just started using the site today

 

[n.rth2]

From my understanding the minority of physicists who do affirm multiverse models are doing so mainly because of the Schrodinger equation. It's a small minority of physicists who converge on the type of multiverse models you speak of, which is strong evidence against it.

Well it's just going to be reason to reject simulation theories on the basis that if they were true, my experiences would all be artificial. And as long as we have independent reason to reject that then we have reason to reject simulation theory. Firstly I think we do because of our seeming. Intuitions are evidence in my view. And I just thought of probably a better response which is just that the simulation theory has a lot of theoretical vices but particularly having basically 0 empirical constraints / novel predictions. So we have a pretheoreitc basis for rejecting it.

Btw, whenever you get tired we can stop. I'm not even a theist.

"Well it's just going to be reason to reject simulation theories on the basis that if they were true, my experiences would all be artificial"

That's a bad reason to reject simulation theory, a better reason is that it is epistemically self refuting, if it were true there would be no reason to think you cognitive faculties are designed for truth, meaning you can't even support the claim that simulation hypothesis as suggested by Nick Bostrom is true

 

[n.rth2]

The multiverse under the Schrodinger equation would still only have branches that operate under the same laws of physics / cosmological constants. I think we have good reason to rule out a simulation for the same reason we have reason to rule out any skeptical scenarios through Moorean shifts (I.e., to me it's more plausible that my experience is genuine than it's plausible that I could be having a purely simulated experience.

Under analytic idealism fine-tuning is more expected than under theism.

 

[n.rth2]

Well it's just going to be an induction from the way agents act, to say that agents act in ways where there is variability and they fix things according to some goal. So that induction would favor a mind being responsible for what we see with the fine tuning of the constants.

Plus all we need for God to have a reason to create is just that (a) Moral realism is true (b) internalism about moral reasons is true, and then if those are true it seems moral facts could at least plausible cause an agent to create a world with life, value, meaning, etc.

Even if you want to say the conjunction of the 2 is unlikely it's certainly more likely than fine tuning under naturalism which will be like 1 / ((10^(10^123)) according to some estimates

If God is perfect and lacks nothing, why would He create anything??

Also under analytic idealism, which is atheistic, fine tuning is much more expected than under theism.

"Plus all we need for God to have a reason to create is just that (a) Moral realism is true (b) internalism about moral reasons is true, and then if those are true it seems moral facts could at least plausible cause an agent to create a world with life, value, meaning, etc"

Euthyphro Dilemma

Also analytic idealism could ground moral realism, and idk if i accept Moral realism for sure.

 

[inyerta]

 

[Tenres]

its predicted under analytic idealism

Also late cosmologist Douglas Adams put it best: "Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This hole I find myself in is perfectly shaped to fit me, must have been designed for me!'" In that sense u could say we in are the puddle. Of course the universe's constants allow us to exist if they didn't, we wouldn't be here to measure them. We are adapted to the universe, not the other way around.

Also 99.9% of the universe is lethal, if the universe was actually fine-tuned by an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God specifically to host life, it is for some reason hostile to life.

And if the constants are physically necessary then you can't even make an argument from probability.

How so?

This just isn't relevant because I agree that once we suppose life exists, the probability that there are specific values of the parameters that allow for life is 1. The question is just what theory independently predicts that those parameters would allow for life. I don't think the version of the anthropic principle your running really works here, unless we're embedding in our background data that life exists. If we're not then it's simply updating in favor of the hypothesis that independently predicts life (although this is currently in dispute as you want to say idealism can predict it equally as well).

On them just being physically necessary, yeah then obviously the probability of them being otherwise is 0. For now I'd say if they couldn't be otherwise, then there is a contradiction in them being otherwise. So then I'll just ask you to show what the contradiction would be. Secondly, we can suppose that conceivability principle is true where what is conceivable is possible. And so it's possible for the constants to be otherwise because phycisists can model alternate constants.

"Well it's just going to be reason to reject simulation theories on the basis that if they were true, my experiences would all be artificial"

That's a bad reason to reject simulation theory, a better reason is that it is epistemically self refuting, if it were true there would be no reason to think you cognitive faculties are designed for truth, meaning you can't even support the claim that simulation hypothesis as suggested by Nick Bostrom is true

Yeah that is way better. I just didn't really have a response lmao so Moore's move seemed to work fine.

Euthyphro Dilemma

Also analytic idealism could ground moral realism, and idk if i accept Moral realism for sure.

Hmm, why can't you just say God has some intrinsic standards governing his behavior and that these standards are normative in nature.

I don't either and I'm not a theist, but the argument is just going to be that we have reason to assign a probability of somewhere in the range of .5 (due to the roughly even split of moral philosophers and philosophers at large). And internalism being true on top of that, I mean I'm actually not sure of the distribution there but intuitively it feels like it'd be popular for the simple reason normativity seems to necessitate some internalist principle even if its weak.

 

[Ropeartist]

I see this stupid ass poop skin everywhere

 

[n.rth2]

How so?

This just isn't relevant because I agree that once we suppose life exists, the probability that there are specific values of the parameters that allow for life is 1. The question is just what theory independently predicts that those parameters would allow for life. I don't think the version of the anthropic principle your running really works here, unless we're embedding in our background data that life exists. If we're not then it's simply updating in favor of the hypothesis that independently predicts life (although this is currently in dispute as you want to say idealism can predict it equally as well).

On them just being physically necessary, yeah then obviously the probability of them being otherwise is 0. For now I'd say if they couldn't be otherwise, then there is a contradiction in them being otherwise. So then I'll just ask you to show what the contradiction would be. Secondly, we can suppose that conceivability principle is true where what is conceivable is possible. And so it's possible for the constants to be otherwise because phycisists can model alternate constants.

Yeah that is way better. I just didn't really have a response lmao so Moore's move seemed to work fine.

Hmm, why can't you just say God has some intrinsic standards governing his behavior and that these standards are normative in nature.

I don't either and I'm not a theist, but the argument is just going to be that we have reason to assign a probability of somewhere in the range of .5 (due to the roughly even split of moral philosophers and philosophers at large). And internalism being true on top of that, I mean I'm actually not sure of the distribution there but intuitively it feels like it'd be popular for the simple reason normativity seems to necessitate some internalist principle even if its weak.

"Hmm, why can't you just say God has some intrinsic standards governing his behavior and that these standards are normative in nature."

Dude God has intrinsic standards that govern His behavior, then those standards exist independently of God. God is not the source of morality; hes just a being who conforms to an external moral law. If those standards are part of God's nature, then God is not omnipotent, He cannot violate His own nature. He is constrained by it. Please tell mer\, why does God's nature align with human concepts of justice, mercy, and love? Why not a nature that values cruelty? Under Analytic Idealism, we don't have this problem. Moral facts are not commands from a deity, nor are they external standards. They are descriptive facts about the coherence and harmony of consciousness. To harm another is to harm a dissociated segment of the universal mind. This is an ontological fact, not a normative command from on high. It clearly the Euthyphro dilemma because it does not posit a separate lawgiver, but theism does.

"I don't either and I'm not a theist, but the argument is just going to be that we have reason to assign a probability of somewhere in the range of .5 (due to the roughly even split of moral philosophers and philosophers at large"

Thats an argumentum ad populum

"idealism can predict it equally as well"

nope alot its much better

Criteria	Analytic Idealism	Classical Theism
Is fine-tuning necessary or contingent?	Necessary: it flows from the nature of consciousness.	Contingent: God could have chosen otherwise.
Can you deduce fine-tuning before observing it?	Yes: stable mind requires stable grammar.	No: God's choices are inscrutable and arbitrary.
Does the framework provide a mechanism for fine-tuning?	Yes: the constants are the extrinsic appearance of mental coherence.	No: "God willed it" is not a mechanism; it is a placeholder.
Is the explanation parsimonious?	Yes: only one substance (consciousness).	No: requires God + universe + divine motives.
Does it survive the Problem of Evil / Hostile Universe?	Yes: suffering is friction of dissociation, not divine malice.	No: omnibenevolent God seemingly conflicts with cosmic hostility.
Is the prediction ad hoc?	No: it is a logical deduction.	Yes: it is a post-hoc rationalization.

P1: God is omnipotent. This means God can create any logically possible universe (or none at all).
P2: The set of logically possible universes is infinite (or at least unimaginably vast). There are infinite ways to arrange physical P, laws, particle masses, dimensionalities, etc.
P3: God is perfectly self-sufficient (aseity). He lacks nothing and has no needs or compulsions.
P4: Therefore, God's decision to create this specific universe (Universe U) is a choice among an infinite set of equally possible alternatives.
C: When you choose one item from an infinite set with no weighted preference, the probability of picking any specific item (like Universe U) is 1/infinitely, which mathematically equals zero.

Meaning, under Classical Theism, the probability that this exact universe exists is exactly 0%. It is not merely "unlikely" it is statistically impossible in any single meaningful sense.

"On them just being physically necessary, yeah then obviously the probability of them being otherwise is 0. For now I'd say if they couldn't be otherwise, then there is a contradiction in them being otherwise"

Thats objection only works if u accept that conceivability without contradiction(s) entails metaphysical possibility. And if you do I can run the Negative modal ontological argument against the existence of god.