brielarsonbf
thats all I ask for
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n.rth2
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its predicted under analytic idealism
Also late cosmologist Douglas Adams put it best: "Imagine a puddle waking up one morning and thinking, 'This hole I find myself in is perfectly shaped to fit me, must have been designed for me!'" In that sense u could say we in are the puddle. Of course the universe's constants allow us to exist if they didn't, we wouldn't be here to measure them. We are adapted to the universe, not the other way around.
Also 99.9% of the universe is lethal, if the universe was actually fine-tuned by an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God specifically to host life, it is for some reason hostile to life.
And if the constants are physically necessary then you can't even make an argument from probability.
n.rth2
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yea i just started using the site today
n.rth2
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"Well it's just going to be reason to reject simulation theories on the basis that if they were true, my experiences would all be artificial"
That's a bad reason to reject simulation theory, a better reason is that it is epistemically self refuting, if it were true there would be no reason to think you cognitive faculties are designed for truth, meaning you can't even support the claim that simulation hypothesis as suggested by Nick Bostrom is true
n.rth2
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Under analytic idealism fine-tuning is more expected than under theism.
n.rth2
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If God is perfect and lacks nothing, why would He create anything??
Also under analytic idealism, which is atheistic, fine tuning is much more expected than under theism.
"Plus all we need for God to have a reason to create is just that (a) Moral realism is true (b) internalism about moral reasons is true, and then if those are true it seems moral facts could at least plausible cause an agent to create a world with life, value, meaning, etc"
Euthyphro Dilemma
Also analytic idealism could ground moral realism, and idk if i accept Moral realism for sure.
inyerta
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Tenres
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How so?
This just isn't relevant because I agree that once we suppose life exists, the probability that there are specific values of the parameters that allow for life is 1. The question is just what theory independently predicts that those parameters would allow for life. I don't think the version of the anthropic principle your running really works here, unless we're embedding in our background data that life exists. If we're not then it's simply updating in favor of the hypothesis that independently predicts life (although this is currently in dispute as you want to say idealism can predict it equally as well).
On them just being physically necessary, yeah then obviously the probability of them being otherwise is 0. For now I'd say if they couldn't be otherwise, then there is a contradiction in them being otherwise. So then I'll just ask you to show what the contradiction would be. Secondly, we can suppose that conceivability principle is true where what is conceivable is possible. And so it's possible for the constants to be otherwise because phycisists can model alternate constants.
Yeah that is way better. I just didn't really have a response lmao so Moore's move seemed to work fine.
Hmm, why can't you just say God has some intrinsic standards governing his behavior and that these standards are normative in nature.
I don't either and I'm not a theist, but the argument is just going to be that we have reason to assign a probability of somewhere in the range of .5 (due to the roughly even split of moral philosophers and philosophers at large). And internalism being true on top of that, I mean I'm actually not sure of the distribution there but intuitively it feels like it'd be popular for the simple reason normativity seems to necessitate some internalist principle even if its weak.
Ropeartist
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I see this stupid ass poop skin everywhere
n.rth2
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"Hmm, why can't you just say God has some intrinsic standards governing his behavior and that these standards are normative in nature."
Dude God has intrinsic standards that govern His behavior, then those standards exist independently of God. God is not the source of morality; hes just a being who conforms to an external moral law. If those standards are part of God's nature, then God is not omnipotent, He cannot violate His own nature. He is constrained by it. Please tell mer\, why does God's nature align with human concepts of justice, mercy, and love? Why not a nature that values cruelty? Under Analytic Idealism, we don't have this problem. Moral facts are not commands from a deity, nor are they external standards. They are descriptive facts about the coherence and harmony of consciousness. To harm another is to harm a dissociated segment of the universal mind. This is an ontological fact, not a normative command from on high. It clearly the Euthyphro dilemma because it does not posit a separate lawgiver, but theism does.
"I don't either and I'm not a theist, but the argument is just going to be that we have reason to assign a probability of somewhere in the range of .5 (due to the roughly even split of moral philosophers and philosophers at large"
Thats an argumentum ad populum
"idealism can predict it equally as well"
nope alot its much better
| Criteria | Analytic Idealism | Classical Theism |
|---|---|---|
| Is fine-tuning necessary or contingent? | Necessary: it flows from the nature of consciousness. | Contingent: God could have chosen otherwise. |
| Can you deduce fine-tuning before observing it? | Yes: stable mind requires stable grammar. | No: God's choices are inscrutable and arbitrary. |
| Does the framework provide a mechanism for fine-tuning? | Yes: the constants are the extrinsic appearance of mental coherence. | No: "God willed it" is not a mechanism; it is a placeholder. |
| Is the explanation parsimonious? | Yes: only one substance (consciousness). | No: requires God + universe + divine motives. |
| Does it survive the Problem of Evil / Hostile Universe? | Yes: suffering is friction of dissociation, not divine malice. | No: omnibenevolent God seemingly conflicts with cosmic hostility. |
| Is the prediction ad hoc? | No: it is a logical deduction. | Yes: it is a post-hoc rationalization. |
P1: God is omnipotent. This means God can create any logically possible universe (or none at all).
P2: The set of logically possible universes is infinite (or at least unimaginably vast). There are infinite ways to arrange physical P, laws, particle masses, dimensionalities, etc.
P3: God is perfectly self-sufficient (aseity). He lacks nothing and has no needs or compulsions.
P4: Therefore, God's decision to create this specific universe (Universe U) is a choice among an infinite set of equally possible alternatives.
C: When you choose one item from an infinite set with no weighted preference, the probability of picking any specific item (like Universe U) is 1/infinitely, which mathematically equals zero.
Meaning, under Classical Theism, the probability that this exact universe exists is exactly 0%. It is not merely "unlikely" it is statistically impossible in any single meaningful sense.
"On them just being physically necessary, yeah then obviously the probability of them being otherwise is 0. For now I'd say if they couldn't be otherwise, then there is a contradiction in them being otherwise"
Thats objection only works if u accept that conceivability without contradiction(s) entails metaphysical possibility. And if you do I can run the Negative modal ontological argument against the existence of god.
Tenres
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It's not clear what the argument at the start is. To say they are intrinsic is to say that they are apart of God's nature simpliciter. That token schemas of a moral system that alligns with Gods innate morality can exist doesn't challenge that at all.
"God is not omnipotent as he can't violate his nature" No theist defines omnipotence in a way where this follows. It would only follow where the definition entails that \forall x O(x) --> A(x) . Where O is omnipotence and A is being able to do all actions.
God's nature alligns with human concepts because he created human beings with said concepts in mind. Again, there's no clear conclusion or argument given in support of it here.
*Muhh fallacy mongering* If you're saying it's a fallacy, you are saying the argument has an error in reasoning. So that's a burden on you. Secondly, it's simply going to be that it's more expected under the hypothesis where the evidence is genuinely split that experts in their field are split. If the evidence is split, then it follows we have no way to favor one over the other, which justifies an equal probability distribution.
Not wasting my time responding to the graph. But I'll respond to the argument. I'll first note this isn't formally valid, and you p4 contains a conclusion, and then the conclusion has more than the prrmises. So strictly it can be rejected on those grounds. Moreover, which was in none of the premises, asserts that God doesn't have weighted preferences over the possibility space when this is the whole argument. Dialectically weightless. I'll run two objections:
(I) When we are taking the worlds that God could create we are not taking God qua omnipotent being simpliciter but God qua God, which will take into account his nature, hence the possibility space becomes restrained. Once we restrain that it's your burden to show that the possibility space remains infinite.
(II) We have impeccable intuitions against the idea that we can't say events are more probable given an infinite possibility space, hence thats reason to reject naive models that can't accommodate that. For example, the chance that a good God creates a torture world is obviously less likely than a God creating a world full of happiness. So this is just an argument against your probability theory.
(III) The P(GcW)=1/(N : W's that fit God's internal standards on what World to create). Where W is a world, C is an act of creation, and G is God. So again you've put the burden on yourself to show that there are infinite worlds meeting God's internal criteria.
There's probably much more but for now this is fine.
Edit: To address the last point, P1 of MOA and P1* of the RMOA are both equally plausible in most people's lights, yet are mutually incompatible. So either the intuitions that are used in favor of the the acceptance of the premises are faulty, or S5 has deficits. Regardles, I don't have to commit to either one.
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n.rth2
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"It's not clear what the argument at the start is. To say they are intrinsic is to say that they are apart of God's nature simpliciter. That token schemas of a moral system that alligns with Gods innate morality can exist doesn't challenge that at all."
The argument is crystal clear: if moral standards are intrinsic to God's nature, then either they are arbitrary (if God could have had a different nature) or they constrain Him (if He could not), which is the Euthyphro dilemma in full force.
Saying "they are part of His nature simpliciter" is not a solution; it is a restatement of the problem, because you still cannot explain *why* His nature aligns with human moral concepts rather than cruelty.
Under Analytic Idealism, moral facts are not intrinsic to any being's nature—they are descriptive facts about the coherence and harmony of universal consciousness, which requires no external lawgiver and no arbitrary divine psychology.
"God is not omnipotent as he can't violate his nature" No theist defines omnipotence in a way where this follows. It would only follow where the definition entails that \forall x O(x) --> A(x) . Where O is omnipotence and A is being able to do all actions."
If God cannot violate His nature, then He is constrained by that nature, regardless of how you define omnipotence—you have merely redefined omnipotence downward to mean "power within a cage." Classical theism defines omnipotence as the ability to do all things logically possible, and if God's nature is fixed, He cannot do otherwise, which is a genuine limitation on His freedom. You are evading the core question: *why* is God's nature fixed to this specific moral framework rather than another, and if you cannot answer that without circularity or arbitrariness, your position collapses.
"God's nature alligns with human concepts because he created human beings with said concepts in mind."
This is Divine Command Theory in biological clothing, and it reduces to the same Euthyphro problem: either God created us with these concepts arbitrarily (making morality subjective) or He was compelled to by His nature (making Him not free).
If God created us with moral concepts that align with His nature, you must explain *why* He chose that alignment rather than the opposite, and any answer either begs the question or appeals to inscrutable divine whims.
Under Idealism, morality is ontologically grounded in the unity of consciousness—harming another is harming a dissociated segment of the one mind, so we do not need a divine programmer or arbitrary choices to explain moral facts.
"Muhh fallacy mongering" If you're saying it's a fallacy, you are saying the argument has an error in reasoning. So that's a burden on you. Secondly, it's simply going to be that it's more expected under the hypothesis where the evidence is genuinely split that experts in their field are split. If the evidence is split, then it follows we have no way to favor one over the other, which justifies an equal probability distribution.*
The error is that an appeal to popularity does not constitute evidence for truth, philosophers were once split on slavery, yet that did not make both positions equally probable, so expert consensus is a poor prior, I don't know why I need to explain what a fallacy is to u. The split among experts reflects the *difficulty* of the question under naturalistic assumptions, not the *probability* of each answer, whereas under Analytic Idealism moral realism is a logical deduction, which shifts the prior dramatically. Your .5 probability is a default assumption from ignorance, not a justified prior, and it commits the base-rate fallacy by ignoring the explanatory power of the competing frameworks.
"Not wasting my time responding to the graph."*
This is a concession, not a refutation if the graph's comparisons were false, you would easily dismantle them, but instead you are evading the most devastating row: that Idealism predicts fine-tuning as a logical necessity while Theism leaves it as an arbitrary, post-hoc rationalization. The graph shows that under Idealism fine-tuning is necessary, deducible, mechanistic, parsimonious, compatible with suffering, and non-ad hoc, while under Theism it is contingent, inscrutable, non-mechanistic, bloated, incompatible with suffering, and ad hoc. By refusing to engage, you are implicitly admitting that you cannot refute a single row, which means the graph stands as a decisive indictment of your position.
"I'll first note this isn't formally valid, and you p4 contains a conclusion, and then the conclusion has more than the prrmises. So strictly it can be rejected on those grounds. Moreover, which was in none of the premises, asserts that God doesn't have weighted preferences over the possibility space when this is the whole argument. Dialectically weightless."
Holy argument is easily formalized: if God has no needs or compulsions (aseity), He has no rational necessity to prefer one universe over another, making His choice arbitrary from an infinite set. The burden is on you to show that God *does* have weighted preferences, and to explain *why* He prefers this universe over infinite others, without appealing to inscrutable whims or circular definitions.
You have merely asserted that God has preferences without proving that they are non-arbitrary or that they restrict the infinite possibility space to a finite set, which is the very point in contention.
"(I) When we are taking the worlds that God could create we are not taking God qua omnipotent being simpliciter but God qua God, which will take into account his nature, hence the possibility space becomes restrained. Once we restrain that it's your burden to show that the possibility space remains infinite.*
If God's nature restrains the possibility space, then God is constrained by that nature and is therefore not omnipotent in the classical sense you have sacrificed omnipotence to save the argument. Even if we restrain the set, it remains infinite because God's nature (goodness, love, etc.) is abstract and underdetermines physical constants, there are infinite ways to create a "good" universe with different laws and constants. The burden is on you to prove that God's nature restricts the possibility space to a *finite* set, and you cannot, because goodness does not dictate specific values for gravity or the cosmological constant.
"(II) We have impeccable intuitions against the idea that we can't say events are more probable given an infinite possibility space, hence thats reason to reject naive models that can't accommodate that. For example, the chance that a good God creates a torture world is obviously less likely than a God creating a world full of happiness. So this is just an argument against your probability theory."
In standard probability theory, you cannot assign a uniform distribution over an infinite set, so your "impeccable intuition" is mathematically irrelevant, 1/∞ equals zero regardless of how you feel about it. Your example of a torture world versus a happy world is a false binary; there are infinite gradations of "goodness," and an infinitely good God would be compelled to create the *best* possible world, which compromises His freedom and leads to Modal Collapse. Probability theory does not care about your intuitions; if the possibility space is infinite and God has no weighted preferences, the probability of any specific universe is exactly zero, and your intuition cannot override basic mathematics. (III) The P(GcW)=1/(N : W's that fit God's internal standards on what World to create). Where W is a world, C is an act of creation, and G is God. So again you've put the burden on yourself to show that there are infinite worlds meeting God's internal criteria.*mYour formula is a sleight of hand because you have defined N without proving that it is finite if N is infinite, then P(GcW) = 1/∞ = 0, which is exactly my conclusion. If N is finite, you must show that God's standards are specific enough to produce a finite set, and that those standards are not arbitrary neither of which you have done. The burden is on you to prove that N is finite and that God's standards are non-arbitrary, and you cannot, because "goodness" is underdetermined with respect to physical constants and divine preferences remain inscrutable.
"To address the last point, P1 of MOA and P1* of the RMOA are both equally plausible in most people's lights, yet are mutually incompatible. So either the intuitions that are used in favor of the the acceptance of the premises are faulty, or S5 has deficits. Regardles, I don't have to commit to either one."*
You are retreating from your own premise lol bro, you invoked conceivability to argue for alternate constants, and now you refuse to accept its logical implications when it disproves God's necessity, which is intellectual inconsistency. The Negative Ontological Argument does not require S5. it only requires the basic modal axiom that if ¬G is possible, then G is not necessary—and if you reject that, you must also reject your conceivability argument for alternate constants. Also it means the NOA is stronger than than the Positive Ontological argument You cannot have it both ways: either conceivability implies possibility (in which case God's non-existence is possible, so God is not necessary) or it does not (in which case you lose your fine-tuning defense) so Analytic Idealism wins on both fronts.
| Objection | Interlocutor's Position | Debunk Status |
|---|---|---|
| Euthyphro Dilemma | "Intrinsic standards" | Debunked—still arbitrary or constraining. |
| Divine Programming | "God created us with morality" | Debunked—regress of "why that morality?" |
| Ad Populum (.5 probability) | "Experts are split" | Debunked—fallacy; Idealism shifts priors. |
| Fine-Tuning Graph | "Not wasting time" | Concession—they cannot refute the rows. |
| Infinite Choice | "Nature restrains possibility" | Debunked—restraint limits omnipotence; infinity remains. |
| Probability over Infinity | "Intuitions beat math" | Debunked—mathematics trumps intuition. |
| Negative Ontological Argument | "S5 deficits / equally plausible" | Debunked—they invoked conceivability; they cannot retreat, and the NOA doesn't require S5. |
And good job using AI. How does it feel to lose?
