I haven't fapped in a week

[Smirky]

Quite easy. I was so sick I couldn't masturbate. Now the thought of masturbating to some dirty pussy is not exciting.
I am going to continue on my nofap journey.

 

[scrunchables]

0 (zero)

United States Court of AppealsFOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT___________No. 11-1236___________United States of America, **Appellee, ** Appeal from the United Statesv. * District Court for the* District of Minnesota.Chane Phillip Christenson, **Appellant. *___________Submitted: June 13, 2011 Filed: September 2, 2011___________Before COLLOTON, CLEVENGER,1 and BENTON, Circuit Judges.___________COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.Chane Christenson pleaded guilty to a single count of knowingly and willfullythreatening to take the life of the President of the United States, in violation of 18U.S.C. § 871(a). The district court2 sentenced Christenson to three years’ probation.-2-Christenson appeals, arguing that there was not a sufficient factual basis for his guiltyplea. We affirm.On the afternoon of December 9, 2009, Christenson sent the following e-mail,which we reproduce verbatim, through the White House website:i guess obama was right “god damn the usa” i vote mass impeach everylast mother fucking one of you for treason. i would kill obama if i could.i will go to jail before 1 dollar of mine goes for an abortion! illegalaliens shold be deported just like you obama you false birth recordcommie piece of shit. i hope some 1 kills you and stacks your head ona stick to warn any god damn commie that comes after. if you have morevotes then voters someone LIED. impeach, deport or kill i do not careany more i hate my country i hate the un i hate acorn i hate mrs obama,i hate libs, i will not pay any more taxes nor will i call my self anamerican. if everyone can come in and no one can leave it’s a jail, berrysertero needs to have his head removed please kill him like you guys didJFK. hi hoe i hoe its off to jail i go for it the only way to stay alive inthis fucked up country of mine. i used to praze the beauty of grey nowit all KKK fuck you fuck you i want the with house to burn massimpeach you god damn treasonest mother fuckers. merry CHRISTmasyou commie fucks! i would of died for my country now id sell it evenfast then you. i do not trust anyone that pays mils. to get a job that paysthou. please come and aresst me so i can go to court and say “i can saykill obama cuz that not even his real name’. forget the false birth recordi want a blood teast and some dna.My country is evil just look at the hole“god damn” crew and now with YOUR healthcare abortion WE all mustbuy into. MASS IMPEACH on treason. I HATE MY COUNTRY IHATE YOU ALL you like you pay others to lie fuck you and your actorsyou god damn pieces of shit i want to see obama’s blood spilled all overthe white house make it pink. GOD DAMN THE USAAt approximately 3:00 a.m. on January 6, 2010, Christenson sent another e-mailthrough the White House website. This e-mail read:-3-WHATS SO HARD ABOUT A BIRTH RECORD? ONLY NONAMERICAN S STILL TRUST YOU. YOU ARE A CROOK A FEARMONGEL I HATE YOU AND I HOPE SOMEONE KILLS YOU ANDYOUR FAMILY REAL SOON. TO WARN THE NEXT ILLEGALALIEN WHO TRIES TO TAKE YOUR PLACE. I WASNT RACISETUNTILL 2008 THANKS NIGGERS! WHITE PEOPLE CAN BENIGGERS TOO! kill obama MRS OBAMA AND THE 2 LITTLENIGGER BRAT KIDS!An investigation traced the e-mails to Christenson, who was interviewed by twoSecret Service agents at his residence on February 1, 2010. Christenson admitted thathe sent the e-mails, but told the agents that he believed that he was under the influenceof alcohol and marijuana at the time. He also stated that he believed that PresidentObama’s real name is “Berry Sertero.” Christenson explained to the agents that hehad no interest in killing the President and that he is actually a peaceful person.In April 2010, a grand jury indicted Christenson on two counts of threateningto take the life of the President, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). The first count ofthe indictment pertained to the December 2009 e-mail; the second count arose fromthe January 2010 e-mail. On June 30, 2010, Christenson entered a plea agreement inwhich he agreed to plead guilty to the second count of the indictment in exchange forthe government’s agreement to make a favorable sentencing recommendation. Underthe heading “FACTUAL BASIS,” the plea agreement stated that Christenson had sentthe e-mails and had knowingly and willfully threatened to take the President’s life.At a hearing on the same day, Christenson confirmed that he sent the two e-mails, andthe district court concluded that there was a proper factual basis for the plea andaccepted the plea.Shortly before the sentencing hearing scheduled for December 2010,Christenson retained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.Christenson asserted that a mental health evaluation conducted after the plea hearing-4-indicated that he was likely suffering from a delusional disorder, a paranoidpersonality disorder, and alcohol and cannabis dependence. He argued that furthertesting was needed to determine whether his plea was knowing and voluntary.Christenson also contended that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea becausethe e-mails contained mere political hyperbole rather than true threats, and weretherefore protected by the First Amendment.The court convened a hearing, during which the court informed Christenson thatit had been inclined to follow the plea agreement’s recommendation that no term ofimprisonment be imposed. After learning of the court’s intention about sentencing,Christenson withdrew the motion to withdraw the plea. The district court proceededwith sentencing, imposed a three-year term of probation, and dismissed the first countof the indictment on the motion of the United States.At the outset, we must determine whether we can review Christenson’s claimthat there was an inadequate factual basis for his guilty plea, and, if so, what standardof review should apply. This court has held that a valid, unconditional plea of guiltyis an admission of guilt that waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses. UnitedStates v. Limley, 510 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2007). In United States v. Frook, 616F.3d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 2010), however, we held that a defendant who entered anunconditional guilty plea could challenge on appeal a district court’s failure to complywith Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3). That provision states that “eforeentering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factualbasis for the plea.” As this court noted in Frook, “f a district court accepts a guiltyplea based on a set of facts that plainly and obviously does not constitute a federaloffense, but nonetheless determines pursuant to Rule 11(b)(3) that the defendant’sconduct did violate federal law, then there has been a violation of the Rule 11 schemedesigned to ensure a knowing and voluntary plea.” Id. Such a claim may be reviewedfor plain error on direct appeal when the defendant failed to challenge the adequacyof the factual basis before the district court. Id.-5-The government argues that Christenson’s claim is unreviewable, citing casessuggesting that a defendant who pleads guilty unconditionally cannot raise an asapplied constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction on direct appeal. SeeUnited States v. Jacobson, 406 F. App’x 91, 92 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); UnitedStates v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 922 n.3 (8th Cir. 2010). Christenson, however, does notchallenge his conviction on the basis that § 871(a) is unconstitutional as applied tohim. He argues only that there was not a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea,as required by Rule 11(b)(3). Such a claim is reviewable on direct appeal. Frook, 616F.3d at 775.Christenson contends that our standard of review should be de novo, becausehis argument implicates the First Amendment. First Amendment considerations arepresent, see United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1979), butan appellant cannot escape the consequences of a forfeiture in the district court bygrounding his argument on the First Amendment. As the Supreme Court noted inUnited States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), “[n]o procedural principle is morefamiliar to this Court than that a constitutional right, or a right of any other sort, maybe forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertionof the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” Id. at 731 (internalquotation omitted). This court has repeatedly reviewed forfeited First Amendmentclaims for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Wolk, 337 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8thCir. 2003); United States v. Bausch, 140 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1998). Christensoncites Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), andHurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557(1995), for the proposition that de novo review is required, but neither of those casesinvolved any issue of forfeiture, and they do not control the standard of review in thiscase. While Christenson can challenge the existence of a factual basis supporting hisplea, we review that challenge only for plain error given Christenson’s failure to raisethe argument before the district court. See Frook, 616 F.3d at 775.-6-To qualify for relief under the plain-error standard of review, an appellant mustshow that the district court committed an error that is clear or obvious under currentlaw and that the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights. Fed. R. Crim. P.52(b); see Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 734. If the appellant makes this showing, anappellate court “has the discretion to remedy the error – discretion which ought to beexercised only if the error seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputationof judicial proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009)(alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted).Our review of the factual basis for a guilty plea is limited. We ask only whetherthere was sufficient evidence before the district court “upon which a court mayreasonably determine that the defendant likely committed the offense.” See UnitedStates v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). “Wehave held that facts gathered from the prosecutor’s summarization of the pleaagreement and the language of the plea agreement itself, a colloquy between thedefendant and the district court, and the stipulated facts before the district court aresufficient to find a factual basis for a guilty plea.” United States v. Orozco-Osbaldo,615 F.3d 955, 958 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We may also considerfacts set forth in the presentence report to determine whether there was a sufficientfactual basis for the plea. See Orozco-Osbaldo, 615 F.3d at 958; United States v.Brown, 331 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 2003); cf. Howard v. United States, 135 F.3d 506,509-10 (7th Cir. 1998).A violation of § 871(a) involves both an objective and a subjective component.The government must establish that a reasonable recipient, familiar with the contextof the communication at issue, would interpret it as a threat, and that the defendantappreciated the threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey theimpression that the threat was a serious one. United States v. Cvijanovich, 556 F.3d857, 863 (8th Cir. 2009). The circumstances surrounding the statement at issue are-7-relevant to the determination whether each component has been satisfied. See id.;United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 1994).Here, Christenson stipulated in the plea agreement that he sent an e-mail to theWhite House website in which he stated, among other things, “kill obama MRSOBAMA AND THE 2 LITTLE NIGGER BRAT KIDS!” He further stipulated thathe knowingly and willfully threatened to take the life of the President, that he actedvoluntarily, and that he knew that his actions were illegal. Christenson admitted in theplea agreement and at the plea hearing that he had previously sent an e-mail to theWhite House website containing similar threats to take the life of the President. In theearlier e-mail, Christenson wrote that “i would kill obama if i could” and that “i wantto see obama’s blood spilled all over the white house make it pink.” This evidencewas not so deficient that it obviously could not be the basis for a reasonabledetermination that Christenson likely violated § 871(a). See United States v. Mann,No. 99-4115, 2000 WL 372243, at *1 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that sufficient evidencesupported the defendant’s conviction where the defendant mailed a letter to thePresident stating that “You . . . should live no longer” and “Someday . . . you will payfor your improper actions with your life,” and also indicating that “change” wasneeded, “y force if need be, . . . as we become your worst dream”); see also UnitedStates v. Koski, 424 F.3d 812, 820 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Whitfield, 31 F.3d747, 749 (8th Cir. 1994).Christenson argues that he simply expressed a wish that the President sufferharm, rather than a declaration of his own intent to cause harm to the President.Christenson points out that his e-mails referenced “hot-button political topics” andthat the first e-mail used conditional language, suggesting that the e-mails were merepolitical hyperbole. He relies on Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (percuriam), in which the Supreme Court held that § 871(a) did not encompass a statementduring a public rally that “f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want toget in my sights is L.B.J.” Id. at 706. The Court concluded that the statute requires-8-the government to prove that the statement at issue is a “true threat,” rather than mere“political hyperbole.” Id. at 708 (internal quotation omitted). Given the context, theconditional nature of the statement, and the fact that the crowd laughed after thestatement was made, the Court determined that the statement was only “a kind of verycrude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.” Id. (internalquotation omitted). The Court noted that First Amendment considerations counseledagainst imposing criminal liability for such statements. Id. at 707-08.Watts demonstrates the limits of § 871(a), but no particular formulation ofwords is required to state a true treat. This court has noted that “a person may notescape prosecution for uttering threatening language merely by combining thethreatening language with issues of public concern,” and that “[a] threat may beconsidered a ‘true threat’ even if it is premised on a contingency.” United States v.Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1322 (8th Cir. 1993). “That correspondence containingthreatening language is phrased in outrageous terms does not make thecorrespondence any less threatening.” Id. The factual basis in this case lacks someof the mitigating circumstances present in Watts, and in light of the record as a wholeand our limited standard of review, we conclude that there was no obvious error.The judgment of the district court is affirmed.