Reinhard_Heini
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§ 2. Subject and Object.
THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC.
Αναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι αὐτῆς, ἀμείνων δὲ οὐδεμία.
Aristotle.
§ 2. THE true opposite of the term metaphysic is empiric, whether empiric is employed in dealing with states of consciousness or with external phenomena. States of consciousness and external phenomena, whe- ther abstract or concrete, whether considered as parti- cular and unclassified or as general and classified, are known to us by experience either direct or indirect, by perception or by inference; that is to say, they are the data of empirical knowledge or science; while metaphysic is employed in tracing the conditions of such data. Thus Kant says in the Prolegomena, § 1, that metaphysical cognition is a cognition which lies on the far side of, or beyond, experience,-jenseit der Erfahrung liegende Erkenntniss.
Metaphysic takes its stand at the point of junction between the mind which knows and the world which is known, and deals with the relations which obtain between them, so far as these relations are necessary and universal. Metaphysic may therefore be ap- proached both from the side of psychology, or the laws of consciousness and the organ of consciousness, and from that of physical science, or the laws of ex- ternal phenomena. In saying this I am not forget- ting that external phenomena are presented to us
only in consciousness, nor on the other hand that states of consciousness, when reflected on, are as objective as external phenomena. It is enough that Subject and this difference of aspect, this distinction xarà pipn, has given rise to a division of existences xarà pin, a division of them into mind and matter, and their appropriated sciences, psychology and the physical sciences. Following the route of either of these groups of sciences, we come to ground which is com- mon to it with the other group, the common ground of phenomena with a double aspect, subjective and objective. This common ground of psychology and physic, phenomena in their most abstract shape, is the proper field of metaphysic. It considers pheno- mena as they possess an objective and a subjective aspect, and not as they are dependent on a series of events in the kingdom of mind, or on a series of events in the kingdom of matter. It is an analysis of phenomena, as such. Standing thus at the meeting point of the two groups of cognitions, psychological and physical, metaphysic contains, as its proper object- matter, those cognitions only which are common to all objects of knowledge and to all modes or states of consciousness. In other words, it is only certain universal modes or forms of consciousness and of objects external to consciousness which are the ob- ject-matter of metaphysic. The reason of this is, that all the others fall properly into their places in the other sciences to which they belong, while those which are universal, both in consciousness and in its objects, are distinguished broadly by this characteristic from the rest, and, besides the place which they hold in any of the other sciences, have an- other place in that science, or mode of contemplation, which brings into one view both object and subject as the two only constituents of the whole Subject and imaginable or conceivable universe. The import- ance and also, considering the constitution of our minds, the necessity of this latter science, called metaphysic, rests on the fact that this distinction of subject and object is the most general and ultimate distinction at which we can arrive in all knowledge. If the human mind is compelled to push its enquiries to the furthest point attainable by it, it is to this distinction that it will come the last, from what- ever point of view it may start, and whatever road or science it may take. It is the ultimate distinction in the analysis of the universe from the human point of view, and therefore it is the starting point of meta- physic, which is the applied logic of the universe, the method of stating the problem in its lowest terms.
Some may suppose that there is a point of view from which this distinction of subject and object, or, what is the same thing, of consciousness and the ob- jects of consciousness, is not the ultimate and highest distinction possible, but some other distinction be- tween existences, as for instance that of Inner and Outer, or that of Form and Matter. From such a point of view, states of consciousness themselves would still be classed as, what in fact they are, special modes of existence, and perhaps, under the first distinction, as outward manifestations of an in- ward spirit, or, under the second distinction, as forms into which the matter of the external world is cast and moulded. Now what is there to show that a method of regarding the universe founded upon such distinctions as these is not more complete and legiti- mate than a method founded on the distinction of subject and object? This only consideration, so far as can be at present evident, namely, that it adopts a single term or category, that of existence, into Subject and which to introduce its distinctions, a category un- explained, unconnected, meaningless; that it leaves vague and undetermined, because out of relation to any thing else, the totality of the phenomena which it proposes to classify, and thus in fact starts with assuming an Absolute. Of such a single, non-relative, existence it must be admitted, that it has no meaning and no predicates, that it is in short pure nonentity and merum nihil. If however it should be replied, that by existence is meant relative existence, such existence as is relative to us and our capacities, this is only to admit in other words the greater validity of the distinction between subject and object. For by a relative existence is meant an objective exist- ence, an existence the correlate of consciousness, the only existence which in fact we can conceive or ima- gine. Let this objective existence be divided or dis- tinguished as it may, it will still be one aspect only of the ultimate distinction into subject and object, or rather it will itself involve its opposite, the sub- jective aspect; and the further distinctions intro- duced into it will be distinctions of the object of consciousness only, and not of an absolute existence apart from consciousness.
§3.
Necessity and universality
§3. Now with reference to the doctrine that the cognitions, which are the object-matter of metaphysic, Universality. are necessary as well as universal, it must be remarked that the term necessary is but the correlate of the term universal; what the latter is in the world of objects that the former is in the world of conscious- ness. Whatever is necessary in thought exists also always without exception in the object of thought; and whatever exists always without exception in the Necessity and object of thought is necessary in thought. It is not said, that whatever exists always in "things-in-them- selves" is necessary in thought, for of things-in-them- selves we have no experience; but, so far as any thing is an object for us, whatever is universal in the object is necessary in the subject. Necessity is a term which has meaning only in reference to our cognition; it is subjective in its reference; while the term univer- sality is objective, not referring however to existence per se, but to objective existence for us. We shall have to consider in the course of these pages whether any causal relation obtains between these two corre- lates, necessity and universality. For the present it is enough to explain, that no necessity can be ad- mitted to exist in the objective world; that what we call a necessary sequence is necessary solely in refer- ence to our understanding, because we refer the con- sequent to a special antecedent, and bring it thus under some law which we think of as fixed, at least so far as the particular case under consideration is concerned; and that the only thing which corresponds to our notion of necessity in nature is the phenomenon of universality. Universality means, that the thing in question, whatever it is, never is otherwise; neces- sity means, that we cannot conceive it otherwise. In the former case there is no impossibility introduced; in the latter case there is an impossibility, but it is one of thought not of fact, subjective not objective. Like the terms subject and object themselves, the terms necessity and universality are but two as- pects, inseparable from each other, of the same phenomenon.
THE SCOPE OF METAPHYSIC.
Αναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι αὐτῆς, ἀμείνων δὲ οὐδεμία.
Aristotle.
§ 2. THE true opposite of the term metaphysic is empiric, whether empiric is employed in dealing with states of consciousness or with external phenomena. States of consciousness and external phenomena, whe- ther abstract or concrete, whether considered as parti- cular and unclassified or as general and classified, are known to us by experience either direct or indirect, by perception or by inference; that is to say, they are the data of empirical knowledge or science; while metaphysic is employed in tracing the conditions of such data. Thus Kant says in the Prolegomena, § 1, that metaphysical cognition is a cognition which lies on the far side of, or beyond, experience,-jenseit der Erfahrung liegende Erkenntniss.
Metaphysic takes its stand at the point of junction between the mind which knows and the world which is known, and deals with the relations which obtain between them, so far as these relations are necessary and universal. Metaphysic may therefore be ap- proached both from the side of psychology, or the laws of consciousness and the organ of consciousness, and from that of physical science, or the laws of ex- ternal phenomena. In saying this I am not forget- ting that external phenomena are presented to us
only in consciousness, nor on the other hand that states of consciousness, when reflected on, are as objective as external phenomena. It is enough that Subject and this difference of aspect, this distinction xarà pipn, has given rise to a division of existences xarà pin, a division of them into mind and matter, and their appropriated sciences, psychology and the physical sciences. Following the route of either of these groups of sciences, we come to ground which is com- mon to it with the other group, the common ground of phenomena with a double aspect, subjective and objective. This common ground of psychology and physic, phenomena in their most abstract shape, is the proper field of metaphysic. It considers pheno- mena as they possess an objective and a subjective aspect, and not as they are dependent on a series of events in the kingdom of mind, or on a series of events in the kingdom of matter. It is an analysis of phenomena, as such. Standing thus at the meeting point of the two groups of cognitions, psychological and physical, metaphysic contains, as its proper object- matter, those cognitions only which are common to all objects of knowledge and to all modes or states of consciousness. In other words, it is only certain universal modes or forms of consciousness and of objects external to consciousness which are the ob- ject-matter of metaphysic. The reason of this is, that all the others fall properly into their places in the other sciences to which they belong, while those which are universal, both in consciousness and in its objects, are distinguished broadly by this characteristic from the rest, and, besides the place which they hold in any of the other sciences, have an- other place in that science, or mode of contemplation, which brings into one view both object and subject as the two only constituents of the whole Subject and imaginable or conceivable universe. The import- ance and also, considering the constitution of our minds, the necessity of this latter science, called metaphysic, rests on the fact that this distinction of subject and object is the most general and ultimate distinction at which we can arrive in all knowledge. If the human mind is compelled to push its enquiries to the furthest point attainable by it, it is to this distinction that it will come the last, from what- ever point of view it may start, and whatever road or science it may take. It is the ultimate distinction in the analysis of the universe from the human point of view, and therefore it is the starting point of meta- physic, which is the applied logic of the universe, the method of stating the problem in its lowest terms.
Some may suppose that there is a point of view from which this distinction of subject and object, or, what is the same thing, of consciousness and the ob- jects of consciousness, is not the ultimate and highest distinction possible, but some other distinction be- tween existences, as for instance that of Inner and Outer, or that of Form and Matter. From such a point of view, states of consciousness themselves would still be classed as, what in fact they are, special modes of existence, and perhaps, under the first distinction, as outward manifestations of an in- ward spirit, or, under the second distinction, as forms into which the matter of the external world is cast and moulded. Now what is there to show that a method of regarding the universe founded upon such distinctions as these is not more complete and legiti- mate than a method founded on the distinction of subject and object? This only consideration, so far as can be at present evident, namely, that it adopts a single term or category, that of existence, into Subject and which to introduce its distinctions, a category un- explained, unconnected, meaningless; that it leaves vague and undetermined, because out of relation to any thing else, the totality of the phenomena which it proposes to classify, and thus in fact starts with assuming an Absolute. Of such a single, non-relative, existence it must be admitted, that it has no meaning and no predicates, that it is in short pure nonentity and merum nihil. If however it should be replied, that by existence is meant relative existence, such existence as is relative to us and our capacities, this is only to admit in other words the greater validity of the distinction between subject and object. For by a relative existence is meant an objective exist- ence, an existence the correlate of consciousness, the only existence which in fact we can conceive or ima- gine. Let this objective existence be divided or dis- tinguished as it may, it will still be one aspect only of the ultimate distinction into subject and object, or rather it will itself involve its opposite, the sub- jective aspect; and the further distinctions intro- duced into it will be distinctions of the object of consciousness only, and not of an absolute existence apart from consciousness.
§3.
Necessity and universality
§3. Now with reference to the doctrine that the cognitions, which are the object-matter of metaphysic, Universality. are necessary as well as universal, it must be remarked that the term necessary is but the correlate of the term universal; what the latter is in the world of objects that the former is in the world of conscious- ness. Whatever is necessary in thought exists also always without exception in the object of thought; and whatever exists always without exception in the Necessity and object of thought is necessary in thought. It is not said, that whatever exists always in "things-in-them- selves" is necessary in thought, for of things-in-them- selves we have no experience; but, so far as any thing is an object for us, whatever is universal in the object is necessary in the subject. Necessity is a term which has meaning only in reference to our cognition; it is subjective in its reference; while the term univer- sality is objective, not referring however to existence per se, but to objective existence for us. We shall have to consider in the course of these pages whether any causal relation obtains between these two corre- lates, necessity and universality. For the present it is enough to explain, that no necessity can be ad- mitted to exist in the objective world; that what we call a necessary sequence is necessary solely in refer- ence to our understanding, because we refer the con- sequent to a special antecedent, and bring it thus under some law which we think of as fixed, at least so far as the particular case under consideration is concerned; and that the only thing which corresponds to our notion of necessity in nature is the phenomenon of universality. Universality means, that the thing in question, whatever it is, never is otherwise; neces- sity means, that we cannot conceive it otherwise. In the former case there is no impossibility introduced; in the latter case there is an impossibility, but it is one of thought not of fact, subjective not objective. Like the terms subject and object themselves, the terms necessity and universality are but two as- pects, inseparable from each other, of the same phenomenon.
