Anyanglover
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2. A) Uniqueness: Here Ibn Sina presents a philosophical argument for the Islamic doctrine of Tawhid. Ibn Sina uses a strategy of reductio to prove the oneness of the necessary being. He supposes that there are 2 necessary existents, and that contradiction follows.
3. Suppose 2 necessary existents. A and B. if A is distinct from B as a result of something that follows from necessity of existence, then B would share that feature (after all, it, too, is necessarily existent) and the two would not be distinguished after all.
4. But if A is distinct from B as a result of something not implied by necessity of existence, then this individuating factor will be a cause for A (since it makes A exist separately from B), and this will compromise the necessity of A.
5. He adds another argument. Suppose that there are two necessary existents, A and B, which exist together, neither causing the other, and both being necessary. This time, we ask not what makes A and B distinct, but what accounts for their being together in necessary existence.
6. If either A or B is the reason for this, then it causes the other to be together with it which violates the assumption that both are uncaused. If something other than A or B is the cause, this is even worse: both A and B will be caused.
7. Ultimately it amounts to this: If an existent is necessary, then everything about it must be necessary. A necessary existent cannot “just happen” to have an equal partner, or, indeed, “just happen” to have any other trait.
3. Suppose 2 necessary existents. A and B. if A is distinct from B as a result of something that follows from necessity of existence, then B would share that feature (after all, it, too, is necessarily existent) and the two would not be distinguished after all.
4. But if A is distinct from B as a result of something not implied by necessity of existence, then this individuating factor will be a cause for A (since it makes A exist separately from B), and this will compromise the necessity of A.
5. He adds another argument. Suppose that there are two necessary existents, A and B, which exist together, neither causing the other, and both being necessary. This time, we ask not what makes A and B distinct, but what accounts for their being together in necessary existence.
6. If either A or B is the reason for this, then it causes the other to be together with it which violates the assumption that both are uncaused. If something other than A or B is the cause, this is even worse: both A and B will be caused.
7. Ultimately it amounts to this: If an existent is necessary, then everything about it must be necessary. A necessary existent cannot “just happen” to have an equal partner, or, indeed, “just happen” to have any other trait.