The illusion of choice

[Vermilioncore]

I sit here thinking that it’s my choice to do so, but I was always destined to be in this same spot, typing these exact words since the dawn of time. Every shit you take, every word you say, every move you make…all of it was meant to happen exactly the way it did.

 

[Jungcuck]

I am free, if I can do what I want; but these words
But these words "what I want" already presuppose the existence of moral freedom. But it is precisely the freedom of
that is now in question, and it would be necessary consequently that the problem be posed as follows
as follows: "Can you also want what you want?" which would make presume that any volition still depends on an antecedent volition.
on an antecedent volition. Let's assume that we answer this question in the affirmative:
immediately another one would arise: "Can you also want what you want to want?
thus indefinitely, always going up the series of volitions, and considering each of them as dependent on a previous volition placed higher, without ever reaching on this way a primitive
primitive volition, susceptible of being considered as free of all relation and of all
dependence.
- To elucidate in a special way and as clearly as possible the origin of this error, so important for our thesis, and thus complete the study of the
the study of the testimony of the conscience undertaken in the
we will imagine a man, who, finding himself for example in the street, would say to himself: "It is now six o'clock in the evening, my day is over.
It is now six o'clock in the evening, and my work day is over. I can now go for a walk; or I can go to the club
I can go to the club; I can go up the tower to watch the sunset; I can go to the theater, I can go to a movie, I can go to a concert.
I can go to the theater, I can visit this friend or that one; I can even escape through the city gate, rush out into the middle of the vast universe, and never return. It all depends on me, I have
full liberty to do as I please; and yet I will do nothing of the sort, but return no less
voluntarily to my wife's home. It is exactly as if the water said, "I can
I can rise noisily in high waves (yes, indeed,
(yes, when the sea is agitated by a storm!) I can descend in a precipitous course, carrying everything in my path (yes, in the bed of a torrent), I can fall foaming and bubbling (yes, in a
waterfall), I can rise in the air, free as a ray (yes, in a fountain), I can finally
evaporate and disappear (yes, in 100 degrees of heat); - and yet I do none of this,
but remain of my own accord, still and clear, in the mirror of the lake." Since water can only be transformed in this way
only when determining causes lead it to one or the other of these states; in the same way
states; in the same way man can only do what he believes to be in his power, when particular motives
motives determine him to do so. Until the causes intervene, any act is impossible for him: but once
once they act upon him, he must, as well as water, act as the circumstances
corresponding to each case.

 

[Deleted member 26116]

I am free, if I can do what I want; but these words
But these words "what I want" already presuppose the existence of moral freedom. But it is precisely the freedom of
that is now in question, and it would be necessary consequently that the problem be posed as follows
as follows: "Can you also want what you want?" which would make presume that any volition still depends on an antecedent volition.
on an antecedent volition. Let's assume that we answer this question in the affirmative:
immediately another one would arise: "Can you also want what you want to want?
thus indefinitely, always going up the series of volitions, and considering each of them as dependent on a previous volition placed higher, without ever reaching on this way a primitive
primitive volition, susceptible of being considered as free of all relation and of all
dependence.
- To elucidate in a special way and as clearly as possible the origin of this error, so important for our thesis, and thus complete the study of the
the study of the testimony of the conscience undertaken in the
we will imagine a man, who, finding himself for example in the street, would say to himself: "It is now six o'clock in the evening, my day is over.
It is now six o'clock in the evening, and my work day is over. I can now go for a walk; or I can go to the club
I can go to the club; I can go up the tower to watch the sunset; I can go to the theater, I can go to a movie, I can go to a concert.
I can go to the theater, I can visit this friend or that one; I can even escape through the city gate, rush out into the middle of the vast universe, and never return. It all depends on me, I have
full liberty to do as I please; and yet I will do nothing of the sort, but return no less
voluntarily to my wife's home. It is exactly as if the water said, "I can
I can rise noisily in high waves (yes, indeed,
(yes, when the sea is agitated by a storm!) I can descend in a precipitous course, carrying everything in my path (yes, in the bed of a torrent), I can fall foaming and bubbling (yes, in a
waterfall), I can rise in the air, free as a ray (yes, in a fountain), I can finally
evaporate and disappear (yes, in 100 degrees of heat); - and yet I do none of this,
but remain of my own accord, still and clear, in the mirror of the lake." Since water can only be transformed in this way
only when determining causes lead it to one or the other of these states; in the same way
states; in the same way man can only do what he believes to be in his power, when particular motives
motives determine him to do so. Until the causes intervene, any act is impossible for him: but once
once they act upon him, he must, as well as water, act as the circumstances
corresponding to each case.

 

[Dr. Bludy]

I am free, if I can do what I want; but these words
But these words "what I want" already presuppose the existence of moral freedom. But it is precisely the freedom of
that is now in question, and it would be necessary consequently that the problem be posed as follows
as follows: "Can you also want what you want?" which would make presume that any volition still depends on an antecedent volition.
on an antecedent volition. Let's assume that we answer this question in the affirmative:
immediately another one would arise: "Can you also want what you want to want?
thus indefinitely, always going up the series of volitions, and considering each of them as dependent on a previous volition placed higher, without ever reaching on this way a primitive
primitive volition, susceptible of being considered as free of all relation and of all
dependence.
- To elucidate in a special way and as clearly as possible the origin of this error, so important for our thesis, and thus complete the study of the
the study of the testimony of the conscience undertaken in the
we will imagine a man, who, finding himself for example in the street, would say to himself: "It is now six o'clock in the evening, my day is over.
It is now six o'clock in the evening, and my work day is over. I can now go for a walk; or I can go to the club
I can go to the club; I can go up the tower to watch the sunset; I can go to the theater, I can go to a movie, I can go to a concert.
I can go to the theater, I can visit this friend or that one; I can even escape through the city gate, rush out into the middle of the vast universe, and never return. It all depends on me, I have
full liberty to do as I please; and yet I will do nothing of the sort, but return no less
voluntarily to my wife's home. It is exactly as if the water said, "I can
I can rise noisily in high waves (yes, indeed,
(yes, when the sea is agitated by a storm!) I can descend in a precipitous course, carrying everything in my path (yes, in the bed of a torrent), I can fall foaming and bubbling (yes, in a
waterfall), I can rise in the air, free as a ray (yes, in a fountain), I can finally
evaporate and disappear (yes, in 100 degrees of heat); - and yet I do none of this,
but remain of my own accord, still and clear, in the mirror of the lake." Since water can only be transformed in this way
only when determining causes lead it to one or the other of these states; in the same way
states; in the same way man can only do what he believes to be in his power, when particular motives
motives determine him to do so. Until the causes intervene, any act is impossible for him: but once
once they act upon him, he must, as well as water, act as the circumstances
corresponding to each case.

Blud wrote a whole book

 

[Jungcuck]

Blud wrote a whole book

It's Schopenhauer, but I translate it from French so it's not that good to read like that

 

[Deleted member 28904]

I sit here thinking that it’s my choice to do so, but I was always destined to be in this same spot, typing these exact words since the dawn of time. Every shit you take, every word you say, every move you make…all of it was meant to happen exactly the way it did.

You aren't some high iq thinker, you are just depressed

 

[wificonnector]

With each passing day, I am more and more convinced that my life is similar to the life of my father at my age (as if my every step is completely embedded in the genes), but only in a different cover. I wouldn't be surprised if he, too, would sit on such a site. although in his youth he looked much better than me. white skin + green eyes + black hair + better cheekbones and nose (I have mom projective nose)

Besides, it’s depends of culture. Some cultures believes that people can choice, some believes that not. Many people disagree with u

 

[Deleted member 25198]

I sit here thinking that it’s my choice to do so, but I was always destined to be in this same spot, typing these exact words since the dawn of time. Every shit you take, every word you say, every move you make…all of it was meant to happen exactly the way it did.

Go fuck your gf and feel better marica

 

[Vermilioncore]

Blud wrote a whole book

mf thinks he’s the next Stephen king