Theres so many pedophiles

So yes the lumière

View attachment 4878396

In most parts of the world, this is called the era of the lumière.

Lumière in French means light

And my argument still stands

Simone Veil, for example, one of the most know feminists, was in favor of this kind of relationship between adults and children. My dad told me there was a guy who had didle a kid, and he was one of Simone's friends, and Simone made a big fuss to get him released.

Plus the numerous writings where Simon talks about this.

So explain me ?
what should i explain to ou dude, the reason i didnt answer u to anything is bc this is very vague
 
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this is so liberal and moralistic im gonna cringe
im not endorcing rape but the idea of not liking when something is done unto you and projecting it to other people, thats just stupid
Huh, it's basic induction. Given that we seemingly all share the same physical traits that make up our cognition, and seemingly share what we consider negative valences, this particular negative valences (the negative feeling of being raped) can likely be induced onto most people.
 
Demonstrate this lol
The point was about ephebophilia as people here are unable to differentiate between the 2. People get labeled a pedophile if they compliment a 16 year old while being 25 for example. I don't disagree that most adults are not attracted to 10 year olds.

How does being in ontological subjective morality mean you can't believe in normative principles that include execution in this case?
Without a transcendent standard such as God, moral claims come from human minds, cultures, preferences, etc. This makes them subjective rather than objective.
So, when someone says “rape is wrong” in a non religious framework, they are showing a belief or consensus, not a universal moral fact.
Therefore, non religious morality can guide behavior yet it lacks objectivity. That was the point.
 
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Huh, it's basic induction. Given that we seemingly all share the same physical traits that make up our cognition, and seemingly share what we consider negative valences, this particular negative valences (the negative feeling of being raped) can likely be induced onto most people.
Ok atp u trolling
 
The point was about ephebophilia as people here are unable to differentiate between the 2. People get labeled a pedophile if they compliment a 16 year old while being 25 for example. I don't disagree that most adults are not attracted to 10 year olds.


Without a transcendent standard such as God, moral claims come from human minds, cultures, preferences, etc. This makes them subjective rather than objective.
So, when someone says “rape is wrong” in a non religious framework, they are showing a belief or consensus, not a universal moral fact.
Therefore, non religious morality can guide behavior yet it lacks objectivity. That was the point.
Yeah that's fine words can be polysemous. I also wouldn't say most would be clinical ephebophiles either. Any sort of paraphilia is going to be rare simply because if the negation is true it would be considered the norm.

If God is a mind, morality is still subjective. Given that values are a subjective concept by definition, i.e., are indexed to preferences of aware beings, then I agree they are trivially subjective. But even under a trivial system you can have normative rules, so there's still no contradiction to wanting to kill pedophiles or something.

Essentially I think subjective morality is way more trivial and not at all profound, willing to hear what you think. If you want to defend pedophilia though, that should come first as pedocels have never given any good arguments really.

Edit: I'm not sure there is an objective ought even conceptually, I'm not sure what you'd be picturing when you talk about a value or moral system that is mind independent.
 
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if rape then get hanged
no crime is hang worthy
the big crimes that people dont like are medical testing worthy
financial crimes are never worth either punishment tbh
 
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If God is a mind, morality is still subjective. Given that values are a subjective concept by definition, i.e., are indexed to preferences of aware beings, then I agree they are trivially subjective. But even under a trivial system you can have normative rules, so there's still no contradiction to wanting to kill pedophiles or something.

Essentially I think subjective morality is way more trivial and not at all profound, willing to hear what you think. If you want to defend pedophilia though, that should come first as pedocels have never given any good arguments really.

Edit: I'm not sure there is an objective ought even conceptually, I'm not sure what you'd be picturing when you talk about a value or moral system that is mind independent.
First, saying “if God is a mind then morality is subjective” only works if all mind-dependent truths are subjective, which collapses the distinction between contingent human preferences and a necessary, unchanging grounding. Your argument is about contingency versus necessity, not just “comes from a mind.”

Second, pointing out that subjective systems can still have normative rules misses the point, because the issue is not whether rules can exist but whether they are objectively binding rather than expressions of preference or consensus.

Lastly, claiming “there may be no objective ought” is not a refutation of my point about subjective morality; it’s a meta-ethical stance for the sole purpose of being argumentative. However, without objective grounding, moral claims cannot be universally binding and rely on consensus or preference for authority.

You know what you're doing. You know your stance is bread stacked up on water. Please.. Stop bringing up points you know are false for the sake of the argument.

Yeah that's fine words can be polysemous. I also wouldn't say most would be clinical ephebophiles either. Any sort of paraphilia is going to be rare simply because if the negation is true it would be considered the norm.
It is biologically normal to be attracted to 16 year olds. They're fully developed physically. We also are instinctively attracted to those with higher fertility markers. They are the perfect demographic upon our intrinsic urges. Am I advocating to act upon it..? No..
 
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First, saying “if God is a mind then morality is subjective” only works if all mind-dependent truths are subjective, which collapses the distinction between contingent human preferences and a necessary, unchanging grounding. Your argument is about contingency versus necessity, not just “comes from a mind.”

Second, pointing out that subjective systems can still have normative rules misses the point, because the issue is not whether rules can exist but whether they are objectively binding rather than expressions of preference or consensus.

Lastly, claiming “there may be no objective ought” is not a refutation of my point about subjective morality; it’s a meta-ethical stance for the sole purpose of being argumentative. However, without objective grounding, moral claims cannot be universally binding and rely on consensus or preference for authority.

You know what you're doing. You know your stance is bread stacked up on water. Please.. Stop bringing up points you know are false for the sake of the argument.


It is biologically normal to be attracted to 16 year olds. They're fully developed physically. We also are instinctively attracted to those with higher fertility markers. They are the perfect demographic upon our intrinsic urges. Am I advocating to act upon it..? No..
A subjective truth is any truth indexed to a mind, so if God is a mind, and moral truth is indexed to his mind, then it is subjective. In regards to contigency, why would this matter? Any morality that I would care about would be one that is contigent on the conditions of my life and those around me.

God existing does not entail a binding morality either, a God who forces people to follow his mind dependent preferences would entail that, not any conception of the start of global causal reality even if that being has mind dependent preferences about human state of affairs in the first place.

Your point was that there is a contradiction between ontological subjective morality and normative principles against pedophilia. I am saying there is no contradiction.

16 year olds are not fully developed, what lol? Yeah they have lower estrogen, lower progesterone, more birth complications, lower viable egg count, worse cognitive stress adaptations... Buddy you are lost. Oh no 😭. But yeah feel free to list the standards by which 16 years have greater fertility than 25 year olds lets say.

Edit: To expand on the first point, either morality is equal to some description about the world and it's operators, or it isn't. If it's not, then there is nothing about the physical world from which God's morality could originate, in which case there can be no physical or logical necessity of God's morality. Again, if there is, then it's ontologically objective in a naturalistic universe that posits everything except God. If God grounds morality, then morality is indexed to a preference, not to an objective descriptor of the world.
 
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16 year olds are not fully developed, what lol? Yeah they have lower estrogen, lower progesterone, more birth complications, lower viable egg count, worse cognitive stress adaptations... Buddy you are lost. Oh no 😭. But yeah feel free to list the standards by which 16 years have greater fertility than 25 year olds lets say.
I’m talking about the physical state. At 16, females generally have adult hips, breasts, and body shape. Lower estrogen or egg count doesn’t change the fact that these physical cues indicate sexual maturity, which is what I meant.

A subjective truth is any truth indexed to a mind, so if God is a mind, and moral truth is indexed to his mind, then it is subjective. In regards to contigency, why would this matter? Any morality that I would care about would be one that is contigent on the conditions of my life and those around me.

God existing does not entail a binding morality either, a God who forces people to follow his mind dependent preferences would entail that, not any conception of the start of global causal reality even if that being has mind dependent preferences about human state of affairs in the first place.

Your point was that there is a contradiction between ontological subjective morality and normative principles against pedophilia. I am saying there is no contradiction.
Saying that morality is subjective because it comes from a mind ignores the difference between contingent human minds and a necessary, unchanging mind like God. Normative rules can exist under subjectivity but they are not objectively binding and depend on preference or consensus. Even if God exists, morality grounded in His necessary nature is universal, so claiming all mind-dependent morality is subjective conflates contingency with necessity.
 
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I’m talking about the physical state. At 16, females generally have adult hips, breasts, and body shape. Lower estrogen or egg count doesn’t change the fact that these physical cues indicate sexual maturity, which is what I meant.


Saying that morality is subjective because it comes from a mind ignores the difference between contingent human minds and a necessary, unchanging mind like God. Normative rules can exist under subjectivity but they are not objectively binding and depend on preference or consensus. Even if God exists, morality grounded in His necessary nature is universal, so claiming all mind-dependent morality is subjective conflates contingency with necessity.
Edited it btw, so check that.

You said perfect demographic according to our urge of being attracted to higher fertility markers, but whatever you just backed off that which is a W. I don't deny 16 yo girls are physically mature enough to give birth or rear children, just that they are unideal compared to older women in most every metric. And we could get into others reasons but that's probably a fine conclusion for now.

Why is his nature / set of moral beliefs necessary?
 
You said perfect demographic according to our urge of being attracted to higher fertility markers, but whatever you just backed off that which is a W. I don't deny 16 yo girls are physically mature enough to give birth or rear children, just that they are unideal compared to older women in most every metric. And we could get into others reasons but that's probably a fine conclusion for now.
I am talking about physical maturity, not optimal fertility. At 16 most females have adult hips, breasts, and body shape, which provide the visible cues that drive sexual attraction. Lower estrogen, egg count, or increased birth risks do not change the fact that these physical markers signal sexual maturity. Evolutionary attraction relies on observable cues of fertility rather than internal biological state, which is why late teens can be naturally attractive.

Edited it btw, so check that.
Regarding morality, mind-dependence does not automatically make a truth subjective. Human minds are contingent, varying, and fallible, so morality grounded in them is relative. God, by contrast, is traditionally conceived as necessary and unchanging, so moral truths grounded in His nature are universal and objectively binding (conditionally, not dogmatically). Subjective systems can have rules, but without necessary grounding they remain contingent and depend on preference or consensus. Therefore, claiming that all mind-dependent morality is subjective ignores the distinction between contingent human minds and a necessary divine nature.
 
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I am talking about physical maturity, not optimal fertility. At 16 most females have adult hips, breasts, and body shape, which provide the visible cues that drive sexual attraction. Lower estrogen, egg count, or increased birth risks do not change the fact that these physical markers signal sexual maturity. Evolutionary attraction relies on observable cues of fertility rather than internal biological state, which is why late teens can be naturally attractive.


Regarding morality, mind-dependence does not automatically make a truth subjective. Human minds are contingent, varying, and fallible, so morality grounded in them is relative. God, by contrast, is traditionally conceived as necessary and unchanging, so moral truths grounded in His nature are universal and objectively binding (conditionally, not dogmatically). Subjective systems can have rules, but without necessary grounding they remain contingent and depend on preference or consensus. Therefore, claiming that all mind-dependent morality is subjective ignores the distinction between contingent human minds and a necessary divine nature.
Ok so even if I just grant God exists as some causeless grounding of global causal reality which is where people most apologists will start. I see no reason to believe moral facts are apart of global causal reality, so they need no grounding. So you have to first assume moral facts exist to conclude they would be grounded in God.

Probably going to dip, not to be that guy but it's late, but it seems if you argue moral facts to exist, then either you just index them to some preference God has, or you index them to some physical / metaphysical state which doesn't depend on a theistic account. So any physicalist account can simply be added to a naturalist model, whereas any appeal to God's nature seems to just index moral facts to some mental state God has in which he prefers / judges human beings differently.
 
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i dont think rape is ever justifiable
:soy::soy::soy::soy::soy::soy:
Go cut your own dick if you think rape is the worst thing ever imaginable , faggot
 
Ok so even if I just grant God exists as some causeless grounding of global causal reality which is where people most apologists will start. I see no reason to believe moral facts are apart of global causal reality, so they need no grounding. So you have to first assume moral facts exist to conclude they would be grounded in God.

Probably going to dip, not to be that guy but it's late, but it seems if you argue moral facts to exist, then either you just index them to some preference God has, or you index them to some physical / metaphysical state which doesn't depend on a theistic account. So any physicalist account can simply be added to a naturalist model, whereas any appeal to God's nature seems to just index moral facts to some mental state God has in which he prefers / judges human beings differently.
Even if we grant God exists as a causeless grounding of reality, the point of my conditional argument is not to prove His existence but to show what is required for objective moral facts. If moral facts exist, they must be grounded in something necessary and unchanging to be universal and binding; contingent human minds or mere preferences cannot provide that. Naturalist or physicalist accounts can explain behaviors or produce rules, but without a necessary foundation they remain contingent, descriptive, and incapable of true universality. Appealing to God’s nature is not about arbitrary preference. It's an argument based upon a necessary, unchanging standard that makes moral truths objectively binding, which naturalist models cannot provide on their own.

Your entire argument lies on ignoring the obvious conditions & the one I explicated mentioned when referencing God.. Please stop dodging via treating God like a human.
 
Even if we grant God exists as a causeless grounding of reality, the point of my conditional argument is not to prove His existence but to show what is required for objective moral facts. If moral facts exist, they must be grounded in something necessary and unchanging to be universal and binding; contingent human minds or mere preferences cannot provide that. Naturalist or physicalist accounts can explain behaviors or produce rules, but without a necessary foundation they remain contingent, descriptive, and incapable of true universality. Appealing to God’s nature is not about arbitrary preference. It's an argument based upon a necessary, unchanging standard that makes moral truths objectively binding, which naturalist models cannot provide on their own.

Your entire argument lies on ignoring the obvious conditions & the one I explicated mentioned when referencing God.. Please stop dodging via treating God like a human.
Wat lol.

The arg is just if God grounds morality it's either indexed to his mind or it's indexed to some nomological or logical condition (or conjunction of conditions). And so then the first one is subjective, and the second one is accountable in a physicalist model.

So essentially it's just "If God can ground morality objectively so can a naturalist account of the universe" because if God grounds morality in any other way it's subjective.

If you were just arguing "If objective moral facts, God" then I didn't track but it still doesn't address the lack of coherency of an objective morality in the first place. For example, we can't say an objective morality is one where everybody who has access to it follows it, or knows they should follow it. We can't say it's just some set of rules not dependent on a mind, because that could include any random list generated by AI, so we basically have no account of what an objective morality would actually be analytically.
 
Wat lol.

The arg is just if God grounds morality it's either indexed to his mind or it's indexed to some nomological or logical condition (or conjunction of conditions). And so then the first one is subjective, and the second one is accountable in a physicalist model.

So essentially it's just "If God can ground morality objectively so can a naturalist account of the universe" because if God grounds morality in any other way it's subjective.

If you were just arguing "If objective moral facts, God" then I didn't track but it still doesn't address the lack of coherency of an objective morality in the first place. For example, we can't say an objective morality is one where everybody who has access to it follows it, or knows they should follow it. We can't say it's just some set of rules not dependent on a mind, because that could include any random list generated by AI, so we basically have no account of what an objective morality would actually be analytically.
Your argument creates a false dichotomy.... If morality is “indexed to God’s mind” in the sense of arbitrary preference, it would be subjective, but that is not the classical claim. You KNOW this is the case. STOP using this as your argument. The claim is that morality is grounded in a necessary, unchanging nature, not a contingent preference, so it is neither subjective nor reducible to physical states.

Saying this could be reduced to a physicalist model misses the issue, which is normativity. A naturalist account can describe states of affairs, but it cannot explain why those states are objectively binding rather than just facts about the world. Describing suffering or cooperation does not prove an objective “ought” without some necessary grounding.

Your claim that objective morality is incoherent also fails. Objective morality does not require universal agreement or awareness, just as objective truths in logic or mathematics do not require everyone to recognize them. It simply means moral truths are mind-independent in the sense of not depending on contingent human preferences, not that they are arbitrary rules or universally followed.

Finally, your objection still treats God as if He were a contingent mind or a set of preferences. My argument explicitly defines God as necessary and unchanging, so grounding morality in that nature avoids both subjectivity and reducibility to physical descriptions.
 
Your argument creates a false dichotomy.... If morality is “indexed to God’s mind” in the sense of arbitrary preference, it would be subjective, but that is not the classical claim. You KNOW this is the case. STOP using this as your argument. The claim is that morality is grounded in a necessary, unchanging nature, not a contingent preference, so it is neither subjective nor reducible to physical states.

Saying this could be reduced to a physicalist model misses the issue, which is normativity. A naturalist account can describe states of affairs, but it cannot explain why those states are objectively binding rather than just facts about the world. Describing suffering or cooperation does not prove an objective “ought” without some necessary grounding.

Your claim that objective morality is incoherent also fails. Objective morality does not require universal agreement or awareness, just as objective truths in logic or mathematics do not require everyone to recognize them. It simply means moral truths are mind-independent in the sense of not depending on contingent human preferences, not that they are arbitrary rules or universally followed.

Finally, your objection still treats God as if He were a contingent mind or a set of preferences. My argument explicitly defines God as necessary and unchanging, so grounding morality in that nature avoids both subjectivity and reducibility to physical descriptions.
your a pedophile
 
Your argument creates a false dichotomy.... If morality is “indexed to God’s mind” in the sense of arbitrary preference, it would be subjective, but that is not the classical claim. You KNOW this is the case. STOP using this as your argument. The claim is that morality is grounded in a necessary, unchanging nature, not a contingent preference, so it is neither subjective nor reducible to physical states.

Saying this could be reduced to a physicalist model misses the issue, which is normativity. A naturalist account can describe states of affairs, but it cannot explain why those states are objectively binding rather than just facts about the world. Describing suffering or cooperation does not prove an objective “ought” without some necessary grounding.

Your claim that objective morality is incoherent also fails. Objective morality does not require universal agreement or awareness, just as objective truths in logic or mathematics do not require everyone to recognize them. It simply means moral truths are mind-independent in the sense of not depending on contingent human preferences, not that they are arbitrary rules or universally followed.

Finally, your objection still treats God as if He were a contingent mind or a set of preferences. My argument explicitly defines God as necessary and unchanging, so grounding morality in that nature avoids both subjectivity and reducibility to physical descriptions.
You missed the point completely on the account argument.

Wtv, yeah can you describe analytically what a moral system not contingent on preferences would be? Then we can take it from there.
 
You missed the point completely on the account argument.

Wtv, yeah can you describe analytically what a moral system not contingent on preferences would be? Then we can take it from there.
A moral system not contingent on preferences would be one where moral truths are grounded in a necessary foundation of reality itself, not in the desires or attitudes of any contingent mind. In this framework, “X is wrong” is true because it fails to align with that necessary grounding, not because anyone prefers or disapproves of it. This is analogous to logical truths, which are not true because we like them, but because they follow necessarily from the structure of reality or reason itself.

So the distinction is that preference based systems depend on contingent mental states, whereas an objective moral system depends on a necessary, unchanging grounding that determines truth independent of any individual or collective opinion. In classical theism, God is not part of reality like a contingent mind, but the necessary foundation of reality itself, so moral truths grounded in that are not subjective or reducible to physical states.
 
A moral system not contingent on preferences would be one where moral truths are grounded in a necessary foundation of reality itself, not in the desires or attitudes of any contingent mind. In this framework, “X is wrong” is true because it fails to align with that necessary grounding, not because anyone prefers or disapproves of it. This is analogous to logical truths, which are not true because we like them, but because they follow necessarily from the structure of reality or reason itself.

So the distinction is that preference based systems depend on contingent mental states, whereas an objective moral system depends on a necessary, unchanging grounding that determines truth independent of any individual or collective opinion. In classical theism, God is not part of reality like a contingent mind, but the necessary foundation of reality itself, so moral truths grounded in that are not subjective or reducible to physical states.
Yeah ok that's a good example, so let's take the LOEM and say "there is either a tree at location x, or there isn't a tree at location x" seemingly everyone understands that whether or not minds exist. If no mind exists, and we just have some sentence "doing x action is wrong" because seemingly for wrongness to exist, a mind needs to exist. So basically in a world with no minds, I wouldn't just say morality is not utile, I'd say it refers to nothing.

For example in the structure of a moral claim, if say "You did wrong action, x, because you hurt Jordain gratuitously" I can't imagine any context in which this makes sense if there isn't a mind-based causality, and some negative valences caused by some action by a subject who's also an agent.
 
Yeah ok that's a good example, so let's take the LOEM and say "there is either a tree at location x, or there isn't a tree at location x" seemingly everyone understands that whether or not minds exist. If no mind exists, and we just have some sentence "doing x action is wrong" because seemingly for wrongness to exist, a mind needs to exist. So basically in a world with no minds, I wouldn't just say morality is not utile, I'd say it refers to nothing.

For example in the structure of a moral claim, if say "You did wrong action, x, because you hurt Jordain gratuitously" I can't imagine any context in which this makes sense if there isn't a mind-based causality, and some negative valences caused by some action by a subject who's also an agent.
You’re conflating two different things: the existence of moral truths and the conditions under which they are instantiated or recognized. Even in a world with no minds, a statement like “gratuitous suffering is wrong” can still be true in the same way mathematical truths are true even if no one is there to think them. The fact that moral claims involve agents and experiences does not mean their truth depends on contingent minds any more than logical truths depend on thinkers to exist.

Your example shows that moral language presupposes agents and experiences, but that is about application, not grounding. Moral truths can be grounded in a necessary foundation while only becoming applicable when agents exist, just like physical laws exist even in regions where they are not currently instantiated.

So the absence of minds would remove the instantiation and recognition of moral facts, not their truth value or grounding. Your argument assumes that because morality involves minds in practice, it must be ontologically dependent on them, which does not follow.
 
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You’re conflating two different things: the existence of moral truths and the conditions under which they are instantiated or recognized. Even in a world with no minds, a statement like “gratuitous suffering is wrong” can still be true in the same way mathematical truths are true even if no one is there to think them. The fact that moral claims involve agents and experiences does not mean their truth depends on contingent minds any more than logical truths depend on thinkers to exist.

Your example shows that moral language presupposes agents and experiences, but that is about application, not grounding. Moral truths can be grounded in a necessary foundation while only becoming applicable when agents exist, just like physical laws exist even in regions where they are not currently instantiated.

So the absence of minds would remove the instantiation and recognition of moral facts, not their truth value or grounding. Your argument assumes that because morality involves minds in practice, it must be ontologically dependent on them, which does not follow.
Mathematical truths would be true independent of humans because humans do not invent mathematical truths. In the same we do not make logic even if you formulate some logical language. The underlying inference rules are axiomatic and are instantiated in the universe everywhere, i.e., the universe itself is the domain for mathematical and logical truths. So humans are not. So the equivalency here would be if the universe did not exist, where I would at least be agnostic on the coherency of math if it has no referent in or of the universe.

And so again, I'm not sure if you're trying to be rhetorical or something. I'm genuinely asking you when I say x has the property of wrongness, what is wrongness referring to? My whole point is that wrogness is only coherent (has a referent) when it's subjective (refers to some stance / preference of an agent). For a moral truth to be objective and coherent, it needs a referent that is not mind-dependent. What is this going to be?

The Hamilton applies everywhere in the wavefunction, so that's just not true according to modern physics. Physicals laws completely govern the possibility space of any state of the universe, but do not for every mathematically valid state.
 
Mathematical truths would be true independent of humans because humans do not invent mathematical truths. In the same we do not make logic even if you formulate some logical language. The underlying inference rules are axiomatic and are instantiated in the universe everywhere, i.e., the universe itself is the domain for mathematical and logical truths. So humans are not. So the equivalency here would be if the universe did not exist, where I would at least be agnostic on the coherency of math if it has no referent in or of the universe.

And so again, I'm not sure if you're trying to be rhetorical or something. I'm genuinely asking you when I say x has the property of wrongness, what is wrongness referring to? My whole point is that wrogness is only coherent (has a referent) when it's subjective (refers to some stance / preference of an agent). For a moral truth to be objective and coherent, it needs a referent that is not mind-dependent. What is this going to be?
Your argument still relies on reducing all referents to either physical states or mental preferences, but that’s an assumption you haven’t justified. Normative properties don’t have to reduce to either. When I say “X has the property of wrongness,” I’m referring to a real normative property: a stance-independent fact about how an action fails to align with a necessary grounding of normativity itself. It is not a physical property like mass, and not a mental state like a preference, but an irreducible normative feature of reality. Your objection assumes that all properties must reduce to either physical or mental categories, but that’s exactly what’s in dispute.

You’ve suggested that without minds, wrongness refers to nothing, but that conflates grounding with application. Moral truths may require agents to be instantiated, but not to be grounded.

Appealing to brute normativity or abstract moral facts also doesn’t solve the issue. Those accounts can posit that moral truths exist, but they don’t explain why those truths are binding rather than merely descriptive. Normativity isn’t just about what is the case -- it’s about what ought to be done.

Simply saying normativity is “just binding” doesn’t explain or do anything. The question is what makes that binding force authoritative rather than arbitrary or inert.

This is where the distinction in my argument matters: grounding morality in a necessary, unchanging foundation avoids both subjectivity and arbitrariness. It doesn’t reduce morality to preferences, nor leave it as an unexplained brute feature.

So the issue isn’t which account is more intuitive, but whether normativity is actually being explained. If it’s treated as brute, the explanation stops there. My argument is that some form of necessary grounding is required to make sense of objective moral obligation at all.

The Hamilton applies everywhere in the wavefunction, so that's just not true according to modern physics. Physicals laws completely govern the possibility space of any state of the universe, but do not for every mathematically valid state.
Your point about the Hamiltonian and physical laws limiting which mathematical structures are realized doesn’t affect my argument. I’m not claiming that all mathematical truths are physically instantiated, only that their truth does not depend on human minds.

The distinction here is between instantiation and truth. Physical laws constrain what is realized in the universe, but they don’t determine the validity of mathematical or logical truths themselves.

In the same way, moral truths can be grounded independently of whether or where they are instantiated. So limiting mathematical realization through physics doesn’t undermine the analogy.
 
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@alurmo u didn't even ANSWEAR ME bro


Our debate isn't even about being for or against this kind of thing.

My argument is that this group of people representing pure, unnuanced or black-and-white morality,

this group of people who are most often cited in left-wing collections,

this group People who have established a morality that cannot be criticized and have imposed this idea of tolerance at all costs .

These people are the pioneer of this idea that everything is acceptable since all matter is tolerance.

I completely agree with you, the lights are woke and are the root of it But being against this kind of thing is most conservative shit, because being conservative means taking our ancestors as an example and not labeling them as stupid for not even knowing that rape or incest was wrong Because they knew it .
You used AI for this, you literally cannot make a coherent sentence.
 
Stupid moralfags, that's why the luceferian elites see you as goycattle. You deserve everything unpleasent in your lives
 
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a stance-independent fact about how an action fails to align with a necessary grounding of normativity itself.
"A stance-independent fact" Ok, this seems fine, something that is indexed to something other then a preference or stance.

"about how an action fails to align with a necessary grounding of normatively itself"

Ok here we've actually gotten pretty far. Let's just say "contradiction to an absolute action-guiding principle."

The problem is, and I already touched on this before, of what action guiding property what you are describing actually has. So touch on that and maybe we'll get to some agreement. It seems you've already ceded that it can simply have no normative value in changing people's future actions while still being coherent in your view.

Edit: objective --> coherent, last paragraph
 
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Simply saying normativity is “just binding” doesn’t explain or do anything. The question is what makes that binding force authoritative rather than arbitrary or inert.

This is where the distinction in my argument matters: grounding morality in a necessary, unchanging foundation avoids both subjectivity and arbitrariness. It doesn’t reduce morality to preferences, nor leave it as an unexplained brute feature.

So the issue isn’t which account is more intuitive, but whether normativity is actually being explained. If it’s treated as brute, the explanation stops there. My argument is that some form of necessary grounding is required to make sense of objective moral obligation at all.
It definitely avoids both but it loses the normativity which is what morality refers to. So you just make it vacuous in the process is what I'd say. So essentially God has 0 binding power in this case, where someone preference has complete binding power.
 
"A stance-independent fact" Ok, this seems fine, something that is indexed to something other then a preference or stance.

"about how an action fails to align with a necessary grounding of normatively itself"

Ok here we've actually gotten pretty far. Let's just say "contradiction to an absolute action-guiding principle."

The problem is, and I already touched on this before, of what action guiding property what you are describing actually has. So touch on that and maybe we'll get to some agreement. It seems you've already ceded that it can simply have no normative value in changing people's future actions while still being objective in your view.
You’re now shifting from the referent of wrongness to its motivational effect, and those are different issues. Normative facts don’t need to causally determine behavior to be action-guiding.

When I say an action is wrong, I’m not describing a force that compels behavior, but a fact about what an agent ought to do. The failure of someone to act accordingly doesn’t remove that normativity -- it just means they’re acting contrary to it. So I’m not conceding that moral facts lack action-guiding force. I’m rejecting the assumption that action-guiding must mean causal or psychological compulsion. Normativity is authoritative and not coercive...

This connects directly to your earlier question about what wrongness refers to. When I say “X is wrong,” I’m referring to a real normative property: a stance-independent fact about how an action fails to align with a necessary grounding of normativity itself. It’s not a physical property or a mental state, and your argument assumes those are the only options, which is exactly what’s in dispute.

You’ve also suggested that without minds, wrongness would refer to nothing, but that conflates grounding with application. Moral truths may require agents to be instantiated, but not to be grounded.

Appealing to brute normativity or abstract moral facts doesn’t solve the issue. Those accounts can say moral truths exist, but they don’t explain why those truths are binding rather than merely descriptive. Simply saying normativity is “just binding” restates the phenomenon without explaining what gives it authority rather than making it arbitrary or inert.

If your standard is that something only counts as normative if it necessarily changes behavior, then even your own account collapses, because people constantly act against their own preferences and judgments. So reducing normativity to motivation doesn’t explain it.

And if the response is “why should I care?”, that question already presupposes normativity, because it’s asking for a reason, an ought. So rejecting normativity while appealing to reasons is self-defeating.

So the issue isn’t whether moral facts influence behavior, but whether their normativity is actually grounded. If it’s treated as brute, the explanation stops there. My argument is that some form of necessary grounding is required to make sense of objective moral obligation at all.

It definitely avoids both but it loses the normativity which is what morality refers to. So you just make it vacuous in the process is what I'd say. So essentially God has 0 binding power in this case, where someone preference has complete binding power.
I’m not conceding that grounding morality in a necessary, unchanging nature makes it vacuous. Normativity does not require causal or psychological force to exist or to be binding. When I say an action is wrong, I am describing what an agent ought to do according to the necessary structure of moral reality. The failure of someone to act accordingly does not remove the normativity of the action.

Preferences, by contrast, can compel action psychologically, but they are entirely contingent and subjective; they do not establish a stance-independent “ought.” A preference may feel binding to the individual who holds it, but it is meaningless as a universal or necessary standard. That is the exact distinction I am making: God’s necessary nature is authoritative because it defines what ought to be, independent of any agent’s attitude, whereas preferences are only binding if an agent happens to follow them.

Saying God has “0 binding power” assumes that normativity is the same as causal compulsion, which is not correct. Normativity is authoritative without needing to physically or psychologically force anyone to act; it is what gives moral truths their content and distinguishes them from mere descriptions of behavior.

In other words, the binding force of morality grounded in God’s necessary nature is normative, not coercive. That is precisely what makes it objective: it is not contingent on anyone’s desires, attitudes, or behavior. Preferences may feel stronger in practice, but they lack the universal authority that makes moral truths genuinely obligatory.

--

Please respond within one message in the future. Every point of mine is restated to keep everything clear.
 
are u retarded, u utter failure of a person
yu dont like foids but dont like rape

thats contradiction, do u not agree with the fact that rapists are caused by a dysfunctional society caused by the efforts of women
rape is a reproductive strategy why would society cause it?
society discourages rape anyways and youll be ostracized if you commit it
 
No one cares about a 15 or 16 with someone in their 20s even Paul Walker had a 16 year old girlfriend it’s not illegal in 99% of the world and nobody gives a shit unless they’re redditards.

You should give a shit about old ass billionaires like bill gates and Epstein and whoever else old guys with 13 year old girls. Not worth getting pissed about this shit with normal non-chronically online people engaging in completely normal and legal situations.
 
You’re now shifting from the referent of wrongness to its motivational effect, and those are different issues. Normative facts don’t need to causally determine behavior to be action-guiding.

When I say an action is wrong, I’m not describing a force that compels behavior, but a fact about what an agent ought to do. The failure of someone to act accordingly doesn’t remove that normativity -- it just means they’re acting contrary to it. So I’m not conceding that moral facts lack action-guiding force. I’m rejecting the assumption that action-guiding must mean causal or psychological compulsion. Normativity is authoritative and not coercive...
So when I'm talking about some compulsive value, I'm not referring to some coercive aspect, what I'm referring to is the idea that person P has access to this action guiding principle, and then changes their actions with that knowledge. And I do think the referent of wrongness simply is going to be some mental reality. So wrongness would have something to do with an observer experiencing negative valences, or simply the state of negative valence.

And if it has no sui generis normativity, then you're just stuck with making it a brute fact (You shouldn't do X because it's wrong, and wrongness means something you shouldn't do) which again, seems completely plausible for a naturalist model to simply say there is no reductive account for why something is wrong.

Then you basically propose a non-motivational action guiding principle, literally how do you justify this? How can an action guiding principle not guide behavior. To be clear, by action guiding I mean something that when known would change behavior, or at least influence the probability that someone will do something. That is normativity by definition. If you have something with 0 motivational power, with no ability to influence people, which posits 0 reasons to do something: it's not a normative system. Like dude idk.

Try to conclude in your next reply, my next one will be my last in this convo as you are basically going in circles.
 
So when I'm talking about some compulsive value, I'm not referring to some coercive aspect, what I'm referring to is the idea that person P has access to this action guiding principle, and then changes their actions with that knowledge. And I do think the referent of wrongness simply is going to be some mental reality. So wrongness would have something to do with an observer experiencing negative valences, or simply the state of negative valence.

And if it has no sui generis normativity, then you're just stuck with making it a brute fact (You shouldn't do X because it's wrong, and wrongness means something you shouldn't do) which again, seems completely plausible for a naturalist model to simply say there is no reductive account for why something is wrong.

Then you basically propose a non-motivational action guiding principle, literally how do you justify this? How can an action guiding principle not guide behavior. To be clear, by action guiding I mean something that when known would change behavior, or at least influence the probability that someone will do something. That is normativity by definition. If you have something with 0 motivational power, with no ability to influence people, which posits 0 reasons to do something: it's not a normative system. Like dude idk.

Try to conclude in your next reply, my next one will be my last in this convo as you are basically going in circles.
I am responding to the claim that moral facts are either reducible to mental states, preferences, or motivational influence. I will show that objective moral truths can exist independently of minds, preferences, or causal compulsion. I will use clear logical notation to demonstrate how wrongness can be grounded in a necessary, unchanging foundation (G), making morality stance-independent, binding, and authoritative.

-------------

A = an action
W(A) = "A is wrong" (a stance-independent moral fact)
G = necessary, unchanging grounding of normativity (God's nature)
P = preferences or mental states of agents
O(A) = "A ought to be done"

Premises
1. Moral truths are stance-independent:
∀A [ W(A) ↔ (A violates G) ]
  • Wrongness is defined relative to a necessary grounding (G), not contingent minds (P).

2. Normativity does not require causal influence or motivational power:
W(A) → O(A)
  • The “ought” exists even if no agent changes behavior.
  • Action-guiding does not mean compulsion; agents may ignore moral facts, but that does not remove their normative force.

3. Preferences are contingent and subjective:
∀A [ P(A) may suggest O(A) ] but ¬∀A [ P(A) → W(A) ]
  • Preferences may influence individual actions, but they do not establish universal, binding authority.

4. Objective moral grounding requires necessity:
¬∃ W(A) s.t. W(A) is objectively binding without necessary G
  • Without a necessary foundation, moral truths are contingent and subjective.

--------
Objection 1: Wrongness refers only to mental reality / negative valence

  • This conflates grounding with instantiation. W(A) is grounded in G, not in P.
  • Agents’ experiences or feelings (valence) are contingent; they instantiate recognition, not the truth of wrongness.
  • Even if no mind exists, W(A) remains true, just like 2+2=4 remains true regardless of observers.

Objection 2: Non-motivational action-guiding principle is incoherent

  • Action-guiding does not require causal or psychological compulsion. W(A) → O(A) states what an agent ought to do according to G.
  • Motivation is sufficient but not necessary. Normativity is about authoritative alignment with G, not about whether anyone actually acts.
  • Reducing normativity to motivation is self-defeating: people often act against their preferences, so motivational force cannot define normativity.

Objection 3: Brute normativity / abstract moral facts

  • Brute facts explain existence but not authority. Simply stating “X is wrong” without grounding leaves the binding force unexplained.
  • Grounding morality in G explains why W(A) is binding and authoritative, unlike P-based or brute accounts.

Objection 4: “God has 0 binding power if normativity is not motivational”

  • Normativity ≠ causal compulsion. W(A) is authoritative even if ignored.
  • Preferences (P) may compel individual behavior but are entirely contingent and lack universal authority.
  • Binding power comes from G, not from whether agents feel compelled.

Objection 5: Wrongness only makes sense if an agent experiences it

  • This is about instantiation, not grounding. W(A) is true independent of agents, just as mathematical truths exist without humans.
  • Normative truth does not require minds to exist, only minds to recognize or apply it.
--------

Logical demonstration of what I just said:
  1. Moral truths grounded in G:
    ∀A [ W(A) ↔ (A violates G) ]

  2. Normativity does not require motivation:
    W(A) → O(A)
    O(A) exists even if agents ignore it.

  3. Preferences are insufficient:
    ∀A [ P(A) may suggest O(A) ] but ¬∀A [ P(A) → W(A) ]
    P cannot create universal binding authority.

  4. Necessity is required for objectivity:
    ¬∃ W(A) s.t. W(A) is objectively binding without necessary G
----------

∃ W(A) s.t. W(A) is:
  • binding,
  • stance-independent,
  • independent of agents’ actions or preferences.
  • Grounding morality in G provides objective, authoritative normativity.
  • P-based systems (preferences or mental states) are contingent and cannot create universal or binding moral truths.
  • W(A) is about alignment with G, not motivation. Agents acting contrary to W(A) do not invalidate its normative force.
  • Brute facts or abstract properties without necessary grounding are incomplete; only a necessary, unchanging foundation explains objective moral obligation.
 
I am responding to the claim that moral facts are either reducible to mental states, preferences, or motivational influence. I will show that objective moral truths can exist independently of minds, preferences, or causal compulsion. I will use clear logical notation to demonstrate how wrongness can be grounded in a necessary, unchanging foundation (G), making morality stance-independent, binding, and authoritative.
Ok so if this is his conclusion, then he's just failed to track so he's not going to be responding to any argument I actually made. At the very least I never claimed that moral truths are reducible to motivation influence, but that's it's a necessary trait or in other words it's entailed by moral truths.

Also whatever prompt you have to the AI either didn't give the full context of my replies, or not at all, the system is obviously consistent, I think there are semantic incoherencies which will not lead to logical contradictions but would be compromising of an argument nonetheless. Secondly AI has shit wm, so it wouldn't track that the overall purpose is to discuss how your system operates relative to your other statement that morality can't be objective under a non theist worldview, such that a (the conjunction of every statement you've made) doesn't contradict b (the proposition that a non theistic worldview can't ground morality, such that a non theistic worldview can not use your account of morality).

Yeah so ggs. AI is my son. No rhetoric. Completely over for AI, over for your raped brain. Put on ignore for the rest of the day so I don't see your cope replies.
 
  • JFL
Reactions: topology
Ok so if this is his conclusion, then he's just failed to track so he's not going to be responding to any argument I actually made. At the very least I never claimed that moral truths are reducible to motivation influence, but that's it's a necessary trait or in other words it's entailed by moral truths.

Also whatever prompt you have to the AI either didn't give the full context of my replies, or not at all, the system is obviously consistent, I think there are semantic incoherencies which will not lead to logical contradictions but would be compromising of an argument nonetheless. Secondly AI has shit wm, so it wouldn't track that the overall purpose is to discuss how your system operates relative to your other statement that morality can't be objective under a non theist worldview, such that a (the conjunction of every statement you've made) doesn't contradict b (the proposition that a non theistic worldview can't ground morality, such that a non theistic worldview can not use your account of morality).

Yeah so ggs. AI is my son. No rhetoric. Completely over for AI, over for your raped brain. Put on ignore for the rest of the day so I don't see your cope replies.
You’re misrepresenting my claim. I never said moral truths are reducible to motivation or contingent mental states. My point is that normativity is entailed by moral truths grounded in a necessary, unchanging foundation (G).

Whether or not an agent recognizes or is motivated by a moral fact does not affect the truth of W(A). Conflating grounding with instantiation misunderstands the distinction between:
  1. Ontological grounding -- why moral truths exist and are authoritative (G).
  2. Application/recognition -- how agents may or may not act on them (P).
Formally:
  • W(A) ↔ (A violates G)
  • W(A) → O(A)
  • ∀A [P(A) may suggest O(A)] but ¬∀A [P(A) → W(A)]
This shows that:
  • Objective moral truths exist independently of minds or preferences.
  • Normativity does not require motivational power to be binding.
  • Only G provides the necessary, stance-independent foundation.
All objections based on motivational influence or negative valence fail to address the grounding of moral truth, which is the core of the argument.

@Scandicel @Fridx @StyIix @polonaecel @sergdying It is over for this guy.. He has ran under the pretenses of "AI." Keep in mind his argument boils down to subjective measures in order to measure the objective.

TLDR: user says "Mt Everest is not the tallest mountain until we discover it." Once a rebuttal is presented, he repeats the argument and says "Hah, you have one reply left!" Once it is demolished with logic he states "AI!"

No winning with these people... Truly over for arrogantcels. Not hard to admit the only way morals can be objective is if it's based upon God... Proving God exists was irrelevant to the argument by the way, he was purely arguing for the sake of arguing...
 
  • +1
Reactions: Scandicel, sergdying, StyIix and 1 other person
Ok so if this is his conclusion, then he's just failed to track so he's not going to be responding to any argument I actually made. At the very least I never claimed that moral truths are reducible to motivation influence, but that's it's a necessary trait or in other words it's entailed by moral truths.

Also whatever prompt you have to the AI either didn't give the full context of my replies, or not at all, the system is obviously consistent, I think there are semantic incoherencies which will not lead to logical contradictions but would be compromising of an argument nonetheless. Secondly AI has shit wm, so it wouldn't track that the overall purpose is to discuss how your system operates relative to your other statement that morality can't be objective under a non theist worldview, such that a (the conjunction of every statement you've made) doesn't contradict b (the proposition that a non theistic worldview can't ground morality, such that a non theistic worldview can not use your account of morality).

Yeah so ggs. AI is my son. No rhetoric. Completely over for AI, over for your raped brain. Put on ignore for the rest of the day so I don't see your cope replies.
I read it all already and it's obvious you're a moron and are coping with the fact that Topology molested you intellectually.
 
  • +1
  • JFL
Reactions: Scandicel, sergdying, iblamexyz and 1 other person
Ok so if this is his conclusion, then he's just failed to track so he's not going to be responding to any argument I actually made. At the very least I never claimed that moral truths are reducible to motivation influence, but that's it's a necessary trait or in other words it's entailed by moral truths.

Also whatever prompt you have to the AI either didn't give the full context of my replies, or not at all, the system is obviously consistent, I think there are semantic incoherencies which will not lead to logical contradictions but would be compromising of an argument nonetheless. Secondly AI has shit wm, so it wouldn't track that the overall purpose is to discuss how your system operates relative to your other statement that morality can't be objective under a non theist worldview, such that a (the conjunction of every statement you've made) doesn't contradict b (the proposition that a non theistic worldview can't ground morality, such that a non theistic worldview can not use your account of morality).

Yeah so ggs. AI is my son. No rhetoric. Completely over for AI, over for your raped brain. Put on ignore for the rest of the day so I don't see your cope replies.
DNR are you an agecuck?

TOTAL AGECUCK DEATH
 
  • +1
Reactions: Scandicel
Ok so if this is his conclusion, then he's just failed to track so he's not going to be responding to any argument I actually made. At the very least I never claimed that moral truths are reducible to motivation influence, but that's it's a necessary trait or in other words it's entailed by moral truths.

Also whatever prompt you have to the AI either didn't give the full context of my replies, or not at all, the system is obviously consistent, I think there are semantic incoherencies which will not lead to logical contradictions but would be compromising of an argument nonetheless. Secondly AI has shit wm, so it wouldn't track that the overall purpose is to discuss how your system operates relative to your other statement that morality can't be objective under a non theist worldview, such that a (the conjunction of every statement you've made) doesn't contradict b (the proposition that a non theistic worldview can't ground morality, such that a non theistic worldview can not use your account of morality).

Yeah so ggs. AI is my son. No rhetoric. Completely over for AI, over for your raped brain. Put on ignore for the rest of the day so I don't see your cope replies.
Gemini 3.1 Pro agrees exactly with what I said in this debate. Fed it the entire page source code:

1775609211834


Keep in mind I didn't concede on any biological front either.. The entire point was about physical attraction..

3.1 Pro can hold millions of words & is thousands of times better than any philosopher in cliche arguments.. The Euthyphro dilemma is not difficult to dismantle.. AI is fed upon this exact stuff..

Keep slobbering within your cope.. You are a nobody and have been intellectually molested by me. You will remain to be a nobody & cope for all of existence. AI agrees that you just ran from my false dichotomy points..

OVER for arrogantcels.
 
  • +1
Reactions: sergdying
Gemini 3.1 Pro agrees exactly with what I said in this debate. Fed it the entire page source code:

View attachment 4883676

Keep in mind I didn't concede on any biological front either.. The entire point was about physical attraction..

3.1 Pro can hold millions of words & is thousands of times better than any philosopher in cliche arguments.. The Euthyphro dilemma is not difficult to dismantle.. AI is fed upon this exact stuff..

Keep slobbering within your cope.. You are a nobody and have been intellectually molested by me. You will remain to be a nobody & cope for all of existence. AI agrees that you just ran from my false dichotomy points..

OVER for arrogantcels.
You got dominated by my imagination while you were AImaxxing on your PC you use for shitty ragebait on .org buddy. You're a low tier.

You blundered on normativity, you completely got dogged on in the biological point so you ran away. All around horrible performance for you. Muhh non normative moral system that I can give no constitutive account of.
 
You got dominated by my imagination while you were AImaxxing on your PC you use for shitty ragebait on .org buddy. You're a low tier.

You blundered on normativity, you completely got dogged on in the biological point so you ran away. All around horrible performance for you. Muhh non normative moral system that I can give no constitutive account of.
Right.. Keep in mind AI is ideal in this exact scenario to analyze who is correct.. Analyzing such surface level topics & finding contradictions is a very easy task. Keep running away from the unbiased judge. You are nobody and will remain a nobody. I study topics nowhere near how much you have and retain 100x more than you.. :lul::lul:
 
Right.. Keep in mind AI is ideal in this exact scenario to analyze who is correct.. Analyzing such surface level topics & finding contradictions is a very easy task. Keep running away from the unbiased judge. You are nobody and will remain a nobody. I study topics nowhere near how much you have and retain 100x more than you.. :lul::lul:
Obviously devolving into low tier memes after being washed while using AI. Also demonstrate AI has good WM + Cognitive depth and recursive analysis
 
Also demonstrate AI has good WM + Cognitive depth and recursive analysis
Google DeepMind Technical Report, 2024

Paper documents the architecture that allows models like Gemini to process up to 2 million tokens in a single prompt. For scale, a 1,000-page manuscript is roughly 300,000 to 400,000 words. The technical report demonstrates that in "Needle In A Haystack" evaluations (where a specific fact is hidden inside millions of words of text), the model achieves >99% perfect recall. It does not "forget" earlier pages while reading later ones.

Keep in mind AI has improved exponentially within the past 2 years..

Do I need to give an argument for why this is superior to you..?

Inb4 "You just debunked yourself by showing AI is strong enough to post what you posted."


Obviously devolving into low tier memes after being washed while using AI.
No "memes," you're just a moron for arguing against AI being an unbiased judge in this case. You refuse to admit defeat due to your arrogance.
 

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