refuting madhyamika buddhism(Nihilism,atheism) from a Hindu Shaivite perspective(absolute theistic monism)(High IQ thread).

[yandex99]

Nagarjuna points out that a moving thing cannot move in virtue of itself because motion and the moving thing are co-dependant for both to exist.they cannot be identical because each time a new motion would be achieved,there would be a entirely new agent(He's wrong on it not being the case,there IS a new agent everytime motion and moving things acquire new movement,more on that below).

However,why can Stasis and the Static not be identical?

Nagarjuna points out that if it was self-inherent,then Stasis would not need to depend on something static to have any instantiation.but unlike motion,stasis is static and unchanging and there is no other stasis for a static thing because it is static and would be outside of time.

So why can't something truly static be identical with it's stasis and thus self-inherent and non-empty?it is.

because quality and substance are the same,just conceptually differentiated by the mind.there is no heat without something hot(Fire,the fire element among the 5 primiordial elements) and vice versa because they're identical,like light and illumination,or wetness and liquid.

in fact go the english dictionary,quality and substance/essence/nature are the exact same thing and have the exact same definition,they're synonyms.

the buddhist madhyamika are right that there is no condition or motion or time,but they are wrong that there is no stasis and unconditioned,that is because motion is just a relation,a analysis of a thing's position at different positions,not a real thing,and there is utter stillness in all things,motion is just an illusion of the mind.

therefore all things are unconditioned,there is self-knowledge only and not any dependant knowledge or desire because all things are one and we all know or desire what is essentially ourselves,it is thus independant and there is still essential self-sufficiency despite the illusion of contigency.

if there were no unconditioned,serially and temporally,nothing could ever have it's conditions fulfilled,as there would be a vicious regress and since it is infinite it would never culminate at any point.

the buddhists rightfully link matter with motion and change,but there is no action(motion,manifestation)without a agent,and there is no action without CONCIOUS action as inert things are incapable of action or existance and are utterly dead,even stillness is just the simplest and fullness of actions.

that proves EVERYTHING that we percieve and don't percieve is conscious.existance means consciousness and vice-versa.

and as Baruch spinoza laid out below,all existance or essence or things with quality are INFINITE and ONE




:

If Substance-A had attribute thought and not the attribute of extension, the question would be what limits Substance-A from having attribute extension? Recall what finitude and infinitude mean in Spinoza's system:

1D2:

A thing is called finite after its kind, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.

Finitude results from limitation. If you posit that Substance-A has attribute thought and not attribute extension, that means the substance is finite with respect to its attributes. That cannot happen. That is why 1P8 states that every substance is necessarily infinite:

Proof.--There can be only one substance with an identical attribute, and existence follows from its nature (Prop. vii.); its nature, therefore, involves existence, either as finite or infinite. It does not exist as finite, for (by Def. ii.) it would then be limited by something else of the same kind, which would also necessarily exist (Prop. vii.); and there would be two substances with an identical attribute, which is absurd (Prop. v.). It therefore exists as infinite. Q.E.D.

If you maintain that there could be multiple substances with different attributes, then your task is to explain what limits each substance from having all the attributes.


ella Rocca (2002, pp. 17-22)gives there a very intuitive response to why there is only ONE substance. An attribute is that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance, and a substance is that which is in-itself and concieved ONLY through itself.

If I've got two substances sharing only one attribute out of many, I get in a weird place where through a substance (thanks to that shared attribute) I can concieve the other substance (in its essence, even), and vice versa. Basically, if that's the case, those cannot possibly be substances (they'll be modes instead, since each of them can be concieved through other entities).

1. Suppose there are two substances, S1 and S2, and that they are two. Now, there has to be some reason that distinguishes them and makes them two, not one. Perhaps they are different colors. Perhaps they have different natures. Perhaps they occupy different spatial locations. Well, whatever that distinguishing reason is, there has to be one. So, let’s fix and assume that they are two, not one, i.e. that they are two different substances. What’s different about them? Well, there are only two ways that they could possibly differ. One way they could differ is by having different attributes (and, hence, different natures). The other way that they could differ is by having different modes (e.g. different spatial locations; different thoughts; different colors; etc.). This is taken as exhausting the options.
2. First way: If they differ because they have different attributes (i.e. different natures), then they have different attributes (i.e. different natures). So, the first way ends with S1 and S2 having different attributes/natures. Let’s check the second way.
3. Second way: If they differ because they differ in modes, then that means that they have the same attribute or nature. Why? If they did differ also with respect to attribute or nature, then we’d be right back to the first way. So, let's say they differ only in modes. By definition of substance, a substance is something that is conceived in itself. So, to conceive of S1, I don’t need to include in my conception of it any of its modes; to conceive of S2, I don’t need to include in my conception of S2 and any of its modes either. (Again, the reason is that a substance is by definition conceived in itself and not in or through another). However, suppose S1 and S2 differ only because one has mode M and the other lacks it. My conception of S1 does not include M, and certainly my conception of S2 doesn’t include M either. Both of these are accurate conceptions of these substances since, again, by definition of substance, I don’t need to include any of the modes of a substance in order to conceive of the substance. That means my conception of S1 is identical to my conception of S2, and both conceptions are correct. Since the only thing that is supposed to distinguish S1 from S2 is M, and since M is not included in my conception of either substance, there is no difference between my conceptions of these substances. So, my conception of S1 = my conception of S2. These are legitimate, correct conceptions of these substances. So, by axiom 4, which states that if I have an accurate conception or idea of X, then X really is the way I conceive it to be, S1 = S2. This contradicts our original assumption that we began with (that S1 and S2 are two, different substances!) So, the second way ends in a contradiction.
4. So, the first way ends in S1 and S2 having different attributes/natures, and the second way ends in a contradiction. Hence, the second way isn't possible. The first way is the only way. So, if you have two substances, S1 and S2, then they must have different attributes or natures. That is, any two substances cannot have the same nature or attribute.

this goes back to essence and quality being the exact synonym of each other,if I have X's quality(like say having intellect,desire,manifestation in reality)I also have X's essence.

therefore since all things have some quality in common,they have the same essence.

that is literally the basis for monism.

 

[yandex99]

I used to be a madhyamakist as you can see from my previous threads,I repent to GOD and have found the culmination of transcendant logic in Kashmir Shaivism.

 

[yandex99]

there is only fullness,and nothing empty has any reality.

 

[Lulleko]

Shut the fuck up you pajeet go eat cow feces.

 

[yandex99]

Shut the fuck up you pajeet go eat cow feces.

I'm a mulatto Tyrone

 

[BrahminBoss]

this goes back to essence and quality being the exact synonym of each other,if I have X's quality(like say having intellect,desire,manifestation in reality)I also have X's essence.

therefore since all things have some quality in common,they have the same essence.

that is literally the basis for monism.

havent read full thread as im high but i dont think this is true,

if a grape (object x) and orange (obj y) are fruits (share in the quality of being a fruit, although they also have other qualities as diff colour)

it does not mean the essence (juice of these fruits) is the same

 

[Turkic Albanian]

Iaintreadinallat

But there's zero empirical evidence for God/the supernatural

 

[yandex99]

havent read full thread as im high but i dont think this is true,

if a grape (object x) and orange (obj y) are fruits (share in the quality of being a fruit, although they also have other qualities as diff colour)

it does not mean the essence (juice of these fruits) is the same

read the reddit thread linked.baruch spinoza explained in detail why they are.they're differentiation is just a concept of the mind(the mind is a elemental substance,not the infinite spirit).they are only modes.the essence is the same and infinite.they're just modally different and thus contigent,but that is a attribute of thought and not real.

 

[yandex99]

Iaintreadinallat

But there's zero empirical evidence for God/the supernatural

dr.dean radin